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Introduction to the Law of Things:
Louisiana and Comparative Law
Athanassios N. Yiannopoulos*
I. THINGS: TERMINOLOGY AND DEFINITION
Article 448 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 provides:
"The word estate is applicable to any thing of which riches or
fortune may consist. The word is likewise relative to the word
things, which is the second object of jurisprudence, the rules of
which are applicable to persons, things and actions."' Obviously,
the word "estate" is used in a technical sense, different from its
accepted meaning in common law.2 The word "things" is not
defined; there is merely an indication that the word "estate," as
defined, "is relative" to "things." Article 448 seems to distin-
guish between "estates" and "things"; however, a close exami-
nation shows that the two words are synonymous. The word
"estate" recurs in several other articles in the Code, though,
more frequently, reference is made to "things." Where the word
"estate" is used no distinct technical meaning may be fairly at-
tributed to it, in contra-distinction with "things." Thus, in Ar-
ticles 272 and 473, in connection with the distinction of things
into movables and immovables, "estate" is used synonymously
with "thing." Similar observations apply to other occasions in
which the word "estate" is employed, as in Article 541, concern-
ing usufruct, and in Article 872, concerning successions. That
"estate" is synonymous with "things" is supported by reference
to the French text of the Louisiana Civil Code. "Estate" is a
translation of the French "biens," while "thing" is the English
equivalent of the word "choses." In the French text the two
words are used interchangeably. In the English translation the
word "biens" has either been omitted or, quite frequently, trans-
lated as "things." Thus, the heading of Book II of the Civil Code
"Of Things and of the Different Modifications of Property"
*Research Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Of. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 439 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE p. 94, art. 1 (1808).
2. Cf. RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 9 (1936) : "The word 'estate', as it is used
in this Restatement, means an interest in land which
"(a) is or may become possessory; and
"(b) is ownership measured in terms of duration."
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reads in French "Des Biens et des Differentes Modifications de
la Propriet6." Title I in the same book bears the heading "Des
Choses ou des Biens" which has been translated into English as
"Of Things" rather than "Of Things or Estates." Further, Book
II, Title I, Chapter I, bears the heading "De la Distinction des
Choses ou des Biens" which has been translated "Of the Distinc-
tion of Things." And, in the text of the 1825 Code, the words
"choses ou biens" in Article 452 became "things." Having thus
concluded that the words "estate" and "things" are synonymous
as used in the Louisiana Civil Code, it follows that Article 448
also defines "things." Consequently, a "thing" according to the
Code is "anything of which riches or fortune may consist." This
definition accords with early civilian conceptions but differs
from contemporary continental civilian doctrine and from defi-
nitions employed in certain modern codes. If consistently fol-
lowed, this definition would exclude from the "law of things,"
and, perhaps, from the entire law of property all those physical
objects and intangible rights that may not be regarded as "riches
or fortune." Thus, physical objects which are not susceptible of
appropriation, or of pecuniary evaluation, such as "common
things" and "public things" would not be "things" at all.4 In
addition, according to modern civilian conceptions, certain rights
connected with the so-called "right of personality" would not be
regarded as "things."5 A living human body and any member or
3. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 452 (1825) and corresponding Article 461 of the
1870 Code. See also LA. CIVIL CODE p. 96, art. 12 (1808) : "The third and last
division of things or estates, is into movable and immovable."
4. See 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 43 (1957). Cf. SoHM-MITTEIS-W.NGER,
INSTITUTIONEN DES RMISCHEN RECHTS 250 (1923); LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER
TEIL DES BttRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 348 (1957).
5. The "right of personality" has been given various definitions and various
names. See ROGUIN, LA RPGLE DU DROIT 252 (1889) ("rights to one's own per-
son") ; NERSON, LES DROITS EXTRAPATRIMONIAUX (1939) ("extra patrimonial
rights") ; 1 CABBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 227 (1955) ("primordial rights"). In
France, doctrine and jurisprudence have been moving toward the recognition of
an all-inclusive "right of personality" as distinguished from the several limited
personal rights which have long been recognized. See 1 RIPERT ET BOULANGER,
TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL 348-9 (1956) ; and in general, DECoCQ, ESSAI D'UNE TH±-
ORIE G]tNtRALE DES DROITS SUR LA PERSONNE (1960). The French Avant-Projet
for a new "Law of Persons" contains detailed provisions concerning particular
"rights of personality" (Articles 148-165). In addition, Article 165 establishes
an all-inclusive "right of personality." Article 823(1) of the German Civil Code
establishes the general rule that "He who contrary to law injures the life, body,
health, freedom, property, or any right of another intentionally or negligently, is
obliged to repair the damage thus sustained." There is disagreement as to whether
this provision establishes an all-inclusive "right of personality" or several limited
"rights" of a personal nature. Article 2 of the Bonn Constitution, however, guar-
antees to all persons the free development of personality, and the consensus seems
to be that a broad "right of personality" is created by virtue of the constitutional
provision. See LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES B'GRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES
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part thereof are generally regarded as incidents of that compre-
hensive "right of personality" and, therefore, are not susceptible
of ownership.6 With regard to dead bodies, civilian sources seem
to admit the possibility of private ownership, though such bodies
are ordinarily subject to compulsory burial.7 Finally, this defi-
nition could be taken to exclude from the sphere of property law
certain legal relations of a predominantly "moral" character,
and, perhaps, "relational interests"8 in general. Indeed, accord-
ing to modern analysis, "relational interests," on the one hand,
and "interests in personality," on the other, should be excluded
from the sphere of property law.
The terminology of the Louisiana Civil Code, however, is
76 (1957). The "right of personality" has been established in Switzerland by
Article 28 of the Civil Code which provides that: "He who suffers an illegal in-
vasion in his personal interests may request the court to enjoin it. An action for
damages, or the payment of a sum of money as moral satisfaction, may be brought
only in the cases provided for by law." In accordance with the modern trend,
Article 57 of the Greek Civil Code establishes an all inclusive "right of person-
ality": "He who suffers an illegal invasion in his personality is entitled to request
the suppression of the invasion and an injunction for the future. If the offense
concerns the personality of a deceased, the right belongs to the spouse, descend-
ants, ascendants, brothers and sisters, and testamentary heirs. An additional claim
for damages in accordance with the provisions governing delictual responsibility is
not excluded." The Greek Civil Code has also recognized the right in one's own
name (Article 58) and the right to the products of one's intellect (Article 60).
Cf. BALIs, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAw 78 (1955) (in Greek).
6. Cf. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITI, PRATIQUE BE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 27
(1952) ; 1 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 227 (1955). In order to indemnify persons
injured in their physical integrity, French courts have at times indicated that one's
body is a thing in which he may have an ownership right. Cf. Civ. Ct. Lannion,
Dec. 19, 1932 [1933] Gas. Pal. 1, 339. But cf. Lyon Ct. of App., July 2, 1937,
appeal dismissed, Cass. June 22, 1942 [1944] D.C. 16. In France a living human
body and members thereof have been traditionally regarded as "out of commerce."
See 2 DEMOGUE, TRAITA DES OBLIGATIONS EN GtNtRAL 652 (1923-33) ; Josserand,
La personne humaine dans le commerce juridique, [1932] D.H. 1. Contemporary
legislation, jurisprudence, and doctrine, however, indicate that transactions con-
cerning parts or members of human bodies (e.g., donation of blood, legacy of eyes)
are valid except where in conflict with good mores. See DECOCQ, ESSAI D'UN2
TH4tORIE GON4tRALE DES DROITS SUR LA PERSONNE 31, 43, 193 (1960). In Germany,
transactions concerning members or parts of living human bodies (e.g., sale of
hair) are valid if not in conflict with Article 138 of the German Civil Code which
forbids all transactions contrary to good mores. In any case, there can be no
action for specific performance or damages. See LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TELL
DES BVGRERLICHEN GESETZBUCIIES 345 (1957).
7. See DECOCQ, ESSAI D'UNE TI{4ORIE GtN]tRALE DES DROITS SUR LA PERSONNE
40, 53, 208, 348 (1960). See also LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TELL DES BItRGER-
LICHEN GESETZaUCHES 345 (1957). The author, however, suggests that dead
bodies should be regarded as things insusceptible of appropriation. The right of
the relatives to dispose of the body, based on customary law and limited by pro-
visions of public law concerning burial, should not be regarded as a right of owner-
ship. Transactions of the relatives concerning dead bodies (e.g., sale for anatomical
purposes) are invalid as contrary to good mores (Article 138 of the Civil Code).
Ownership rights are recognized, however, on mummies, skeletons, and anatomical
preparations.
8. See GREEN, MALONE, PEDRICK & RAHL, INJURIES TO RELATIONS 1, 215
(1959).
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neither accurate nor consistently used.9 Consistent terminology
should distinguish between "estates" and "things." The word
"estate" should apply to objects having an economic value in-
cluding both physical objects and rights, and the word "things"
to corporeal objects regardless of their pecuniary value and
whether or not susceptible of appropriation. This would result
in attributing a technical meaning to the word "estate" while
the word "things" would be employed in accordance with non-
legal everyday usage. However, for purposes of discussion, and
in deference to the terminology of the Code, the word "things"
will apply narrowly to physical objects and rights having a
pecuniary value, susceptible of appropriation, and broadly to
physical objects in space regardless of their pecuniary value and
their susceptibility of appropriation.
Accurate definition of the word "things" is not merely a mat-
ter of esthetic predilection or a problem of semantics. Such a
definition is indispensable in view of the fact that only "things"
within the meaning of the Code can be objects of ownership
rights. Objects which are not "things" do not enjoy the almost
absolute protection given to ownership and other real rights.
Further the definition of "things" is important outside the field
of property law. For example, certain rules of the law of obliga-
tions may be applicable only with regard to "things."' 0 Owing
to the importance of the concept of "things" in the entire field
of civil law, continental textwriters prefer to deal with "things"
in the general part of their treatises rather than in the section
on property law."
Much of the terminological difficulty in the Louisiana Civil
Code has resulted from the use of conflicting source materials.
9. If "thing" is defined as "anything of which riches or fortune may consist,"
then objects not susceptible of appropriation should not be classified as "things."
This, however, is not the case since several articles in the Civil Code refer to
"things" which are not susceptible of appropriation, and therefore, cannot possibly
constitute "riches or fortune." See, e.g., Articles 450 (common things) and 482
(things in common). This inconsistency in the terminology of the Code may be
traced directly to Roman sources where the word "res" was used in two different
meanings. Cf. BUCILAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 107 (1939).
10. See e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1774, 1887, 1905 et seq., 2150 et seq. (1870).
11. See 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, 1 ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BtRGEERLICHEN
RECHTS 494 et seq. (1959); LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BRGERLIcHEN
GESETZBUCHES 343 et seq. (1957) ; BALIs, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL
LAw 473 et seq. (1955) (in Greek). Cf. 2 AuBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL
FEANVAIS 1 (1897-1922). Most French writers devote special parts of their
treatises to the Law of Things. See 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 41 (1957) ; 9
DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS (1874-82) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RI-
PERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS (1952).
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Article 448 refers both to advanced French doctrine of the late
eighteenth century and to classical Roman notions. The first
paragraph of this article can be best understood in the light of
the French Civil Code and its commentators. There, the word
"estates" (biens) is used interchangeably with the word "things"
(choses) to denote, at times, corporeal and incorporeal objects
having a pecuniary value, and, at times, physical objects regard-
less of their pecuniary value.1 2 The second paragraph of the
same article can only be understood in the light of the Roman
division of civil law into the law of persons, the law of things,
and the law of actions. 1 This is the classification made by Gaius
in his Institutes, 1 4 subsequently followed by Justinian, and fre-
quently repeated by medieval scholars.
The word "thing" (res) in Roman law had a double meaning,
and this has caused difficulties and misunderstandings among
scholars. Res in Roman sources refers both to physical objects
in space and to economic interests, i.e., rights having a pecuniary
value and protected by law.' 5 Originally, the point of contact be-
tween the two conceptions was the fact that the law of things
concerned rights relating to physical objects. In the classifica-
tion made by Gaius and Justinian, it is not always easy to de-
termine in which sense the word res is used. At times reference
is clearly to physical objects and the rights which exist over
them; in other instances the word res is used in a much broader
sense to include tangible physical objects and intangible rights.
However, not all rights are res. Since res referred solely to
rights of a pecuniary value, the word did not apply to rights
governed by the law of persons. For example, personal liberty
and paternal authority were not res, since they were not sus-
ceptible of evaluation in money. It should also be mentioned
that the word res was not always confined to rights in rem but
was also applied to obligations, i.e., rights in personam.
Following Roman law methodology, French writers of the
ancien regime classified civil law into the law of persons, the law
of things, and the law of actions. Pothier followed this pattern
in his General Introduction. 6 In dealing with the law of things,
12. See infra text at note 16 et seq.
13. See infra note 14.
14. See GAIUS, INSTITUTES 1.8: "Omne autem jus quo utimur vel ad personas
pertinet vel ad res vel ad actiones."
15. See BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW 182 (1932).
16. See POTRIER, INTRODUCTION GOtN4tRALE AUX COUTUMES, 1 OEUVRES DE
[Vol. XXII
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Pothier used the word choses much more frequently than the
word biens, though no distinction is made between the two terms.
The term choses, as an object of municipal laws, is defined as
anything which forms "the fortune of individuals, res qui sunt
in bonis."17 Domat divided the preliminary title of his disserta-
tion into three parts, dealing respectively with the rules of law
in general, persons, and things.1 8 Choses was used interchange-
ably with biens. According to Domat, the word choses comprises
everything that God created for men. The French Civil Code,
following this tradition, does not distinguish between choses and
biens. In the title dealing with things and their classification,
the Code speaks of biens rather than choses. In the following
title, dealing with the institution of ownership, the word choses
is preferred. Neither word is defined.
For purposes of consistent analysis the French commentators
have sought to define and distinguish between choses and biens.
It has been suggested that the word choses should apply to any-
thing existing in nature, whether or not susceptible of appropria-
tion, while the word biens should be reserved to designate objects
of "riches or fortune." 19 Thus, although the Code and certain
writers employ the word choses loosely to designate biens, were
the terms used consistently, it would be obvious that all biens are
choses, while not all choses are biens. The sea, the air, and the
sun are choses but not biens. Objects susceptible of appropria-
tion are biens not only when they belong to someone in partic-
ular, but also when they belong to no one (Code Civil Articles
539 and 713). Biens may be corporeal or incorporeal and mov-
ables or immovables.2 0
The German Civil Code distinguishes aptly between "object"
("Gegenstand") and "thing" ("Sache") .21 "Object" is a generic
POTHIER 146 (1861) (Chapter I "Of different kinds of Customs"; Chapter II
"of Persons"; Chapter III "of Things"; Chapter IV "of Actions").
17. See POTHIER, INTRODUCTION G]IN]IRALE AUX COUTUMES, 1 OEUVRES DE
POTHIER 12 (1861) (bien used as synonymous to chose at p. 14).
18. See DOMAT, LES Loix CIVILES DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL 1, 10, 16 (1777).
19. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITI PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANUAIS 58
(1952). See also 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 43 (1957) ; 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt
DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 5 (1874-82). In this sense, the word biens includes
things, property rights, and any other right whether connected with a thing (e.g.,
usufruct, servitudes) or not (e.g., commercial name, right of personality). See
ENCYCLOPEDIE DALLOZ, 1 DROIT CIVIL 447 (1951).
20. See 1 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIhRE, TRAITP DE DROIT
CIVIL 37, 820 (1953).
21. See Sohm, Nooh einmal der Gegenstand, 53 JHERINGS Z. 373 (1908)
Wieacker, Sachbegriff, Sacheinheit und Sachzuordnung, 148 ARCH. ZrV. Pa. 57
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concept which includes anything that can be the subject matter
of a legal relationship, with the exception of strictly personal
relations. Objects can be either corporeal or incorporeal.
"Things" are only corporeal objects of the impersonal nature,
susceptible of appropriation. 2
2
For the classification of an object as corporeal or incorporeal,
prevailing notions in society rather than physics are determina-
tive. If the object can be perceived with any of the senses it is
corporeal, whereas at Roman law only tangible objects were con-
sidered to be corporeal. Natural forces and energies are incor-
poreal, and therefore not things within the meaning of the Ger-
man Code. Thus, heat, light, sound, electricity and radioactivity,
though potential objects of pecuniary rights, are not regarded as
"things" in Germany. Accordingly, the Reichsgericht has re-
peatedly held that electricity may not be "stolen" since the Penal
Code defines theft as appropriation of things belonging to
others.23 Finally, rights, universalities, and aggregates of things
are incorporeal, and therefore not "things. '24 Application of the
word "things" to corporeal objects only has been strongly criti-
cized.2 5 It has been suggested that possibility of appropriation
should be controlling in defining "things" rather than percep-
tion with the senses of objects occupying space. If this were the
case, there would be no problem with the wrongful appropria-
tion of energies.
Things are only individual objects, having a well-defined
existence in space. Air, the sea, and running water are not
things. Fruits of trees are not things before separation because
they are part of the tree. Gases, whether natural or artificially
produced, acquire individuality and become things as soon as
they are put in containers. Lands acquire individuality by the
human activity of fixing boundaries.
Only objects which can be appropriated are "things." The
sun and the stars, which no man can have as his own, are not
"things." Living human bodies, and parts thereof, are not
(1943) ; 1 STAUNDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 406 (1954) ; LEHMANN, ALL-
GEMEINER TEIL DES BtRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 344 (1957).
22. See R.G. June 2, 1915, 87 R.G.Z. 43, 45.
23. See R.G. Oct. 20, 1896, 29 R.G.Z. 111; May 1, 1899, 32 R.G.Z. 165. Cf.
Kloess, Die Energien in- und ausserhalb des Verkehrs und das Eigenrecht an
Ihnen, 103 ARCH. ZIV. PR. 34, 67 (1908).
24. Cf. infra text at note 116.
25. See LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BtRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCIIES 349
(1957).
[Vol. XXII
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"things" because these are expressions of man's moral person-
ality rather than objects of pecuniary rights. Upon death, how-
ever, human bodies become "things." Parts of a human body be-
come "things" upon their separation.
2
Following the German Civil Code, the Greek Civil Code of
1940 distinguishes between "objects" and "things." "Object" has
a broad meaning, as it includes anything, whether corporeal or
incorporeal, having a pecuniary value (Articles 175, 239, 304).
"Things," according to the Code, are individual, corporeal ob-
jects (other than human beings) which are susceptible of ap-
propriation.2 1
Fluids and gases are corporeal, and as soon as they acquire
the mark of individual existence, become "things." Natural
forces and energies, though incorporeal, are regarded as "things"
by the Code in accordance with a legal fiction (Article 947 (2)).
Thus, in contrast to Germany, producers of energies enjoy full
proprietary protection in Greece under the Civil Code. As in
Germany, however, rights, aggregates of things, and universali-
ties of rights such as "patrimony" and "enterprise" are incor-
poreal and therefore not "things." In the main, Greek doctrine
follows the German as to what constitutes individuality, what is
an object of the impersonal nature, and which objects are sus-
ceptible of appropriation.
II. CLASSIFICATION
In civil law systems, "things" are classified into several cate-
gories in accordance with a number of criteria. The significance
of classification lies in the fact that different rules of law may
apply to the different categories of "things." Book II, Title I,
of the Louisiana Civil Code contains such a classification. Ac-
cording to the Code, "things" are "divided" into: (1) common,
public, and private; (2) corporeal and incorporeal; and (3) mov-
ables and immovables.2 8
While the classification in the Louisiana Civil Code accords
substantially with early civilian sources, it differs from classifi-
26. See von Blume, Frage, des Totenrechts, 112 ARCH. Ziv. PR. 367 (1914) ;
Schreuer, Der menschliche K6rper und die Pers6nlichkeitsrechte in FESTGABE
FOR BERGBOIIM 242 (1919).
27. See BALIs, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 473 (1955) (in Greek).
Cf. GREEK CIVIL CODE Art. 947 (1): "Things, in the legal sense, are only cor-
poreal objects."
28. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 449, 460, 461 (1870).
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cations developed by modern continental doctrine.2 9 In modern
literature, "things" are classified as (1) those "in commerce"
and those "out of commerce"; (2) corporeals and incorporeals;
(3) movables and immovables; (4) consumables and non-con-
sumables; (5) fungibles and non-fungibles; (6) divisibles and
indivisibles; (7) single and composite things; (8) principal,
component parts, and accessories; and (9) principal, fruits, and
products. This classification is conducive to a more systematic
analysis and a better understanding of the law of things. Ac-
cordingly, in the following commentary on the relevant articles
of the Louisiana Civil Code, classification and distinctions will
be made following these requirements of systematic analysis
rather than the scheme of the Code.
Things "in commerce" and "out of commerce"
The first "division" of things in the Louisiana Civil Code is
into common, public, and private. According to Article 449,
"Things are either common or public. Things susceptible of own-
ership belong to corporations, or they are the property of in-
dividuals." 0 Elsewhere, it has been demonstrated that this ar-
ticle actually establishes a distinction between things which may
be privately owned and things which cannot be so owned. 81 Ac-
cordingly, under Article 449 of the Louisiana Civil Code things
may fall in one of the two broad categories: they may be sus-
ceptible of ownership (private things) or they may not be sus-
ceptible of ownership (common and public things) .82
Apparently, the intention of the redactors of the Civil Code
was to distinguish, as did Roman law, between things susceptible
of private ownership (res quae in nostro patrimonio sunt) and
things which cannot be the object of patrimonial rights (res
extra nostrum patrimonium). This distinction, originally made
29. See BALLS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIL LAW 489 et seq. (1955) (in
Greek); 1 COLIN, CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DR LA MORANDIPRE, TRAITt DE DROIT
CIVIL 819 (1953) ; 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, 1 ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES ntRGER-
LICHEN RECHTs 503 (1952) ; LEIIMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES Bt1RGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCHES 357 (1957) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL FRANQAIS 59 (1952).
30. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 440 (1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE p. 94, art. 2 (1808).
31. See Yiannopoulos, Common, Public, and Private Things in Louisiana:
Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 21 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 697, n. 7
(1961).
32. Article 449 should, actually, read: "Things [which are not susceptible of
ownership] are either common or public. Things susceptible of ownership belong
to corporations or they are the property of individuals."
[Vol. XXII
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by Gaius, was taken over in the Institutes of Justinian. 8 Other
Roman jurists, however, seemed to distinguish between things
"in commerce" (res in commercio) and things "out of com-
merce" (res extra commercium) .4 This distinction rests on the
possibility of alienation of things and their susceptibility of pri-
vate legal relations rather than susceptibility of private owner-
ship. In any case, the same things which were classified as
extra patrimonium were also classified as extra commercium.
Thus, the difference between the two approaches seems to be
that things extra patrimonium may not be privately owned while
things extra commercium may be.
Contemporary continental doctrine, and modern codes, gen-
erally, have abandoned the distinction of things into those sus-
ceptible of private ownership and those which are not, and have
adopted the analytically preferable distinction between things
"in commerce" and things "out of commerce. '8 5 This is based on
the realistic consideration that, while all things are by their na-
ture susceptible of ownership, consideration of public utility and
convenience may require certain things to be withdrawn, entirely
or in part, from the sphere of free private relations. Thus, ordi-
narily, things "in commerce" are all things which the law has
not placed "out of commerce." Things out of commerce are, ordi-
narily, common things, things serving a public purpose, and
things dedicated to public use.8 6
In Articles 449-459 and 481-483 the Civil Code of Louisiana
follows the terminology of Gaius and Justinian. Yet, other ar-
ticles in the Code, subsequent statutory legislation, and juris-
prudence seem to indicate that things in Louisiana are classified
according to whether or not they may become the object of pri-
vate relations rather than the object of private ownership. Thus,
33. See GAius, INSTITUTES II.1; JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES I1 De R.D.Pr.
Cf. GIRARD, MANUEL ItLlMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 251, n. 1 (1924).
34. See, e.g., DIGEST, XX.3.1.2. Cf. SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN
DES R6MISCHEN RECHTS 253 (1923); WEISS, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN
PRIVATRECHTS 129 (1949).
35. See 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, 1 ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BYtRGERLICHEN
RECHTS 544 (1952) ; BALLS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 525 (1955) (in
Greek). Cf. 2 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 68 (1897); 3
PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT-t PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 700 (1952).
36. See, e.g., GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 966: "Things out of commerce are those
common to all, those subject to public use and those dedicated to serve public,
municipal, communal, or religious purposes." The German Civil Code and the
Swiss Civil Code have not included corresponding provisions. It was thought that
things not in commerce should be regulated exclusively by rules of public law which
had no place in a civil code. See LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BtYRGER-
LICHEN GESETZBUCHES 368 (1957).
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things subject to public use cannot become objects of private re-
lations which are incompatible with public use, though, contrary
to Article 482(2) of the Code, these things may be privately
owned .3  Accordingly, it might be more accurate for Louisiana
to adopt the distinction between things "in commerce" and
things "out of commerce, ' 3 " and to treat the common, public, and
private things within these two categories. An analysis of the
Louisiana law concerning things public, common, and private
has been made elsewhere. 39 At this point, the discussion will be
confined to a brief analysis of foreign law.
In Roman law, things extra patrimonium or extra com-
mercium were common things (res omnium communes), public
things (res publicae), and things of divine law (res divini ju-
ris).4° Common things were regarded as insusceptible of pri-
vate ownership by their nature; in this category were included
air, running water, the sea, and its shore. Public things in early
Roman law were things owned by the Roman people. The inci-
dents of this public ownership were regulated by rules of public
rather than civil law. In the Justinian legislation, the term "pub-
lic things" is not well-defined. The term was applied to public
property which was insusceptible of private ownership - out of
commerce because it was serving a public purpose - and to
things which were public only in the sense that they were dedi-
cated to public use (res publicae publico usui destinatae). The
term also applied to public property belonging to the state or to
political subdivisions which were in commerce and susceptible of
private ownership like any other property held by private per-
sons (res fisci, res in patrimonio universitatis) .41 Of divine law
were the sacred, sanctioned, and religious things.42
The French Civil Code distinguishes between things suscep-
37. See Yiannopoulos, Common, Public, and Private Things in Louisiana:
Civilian Tradition and Modern Practice, 21 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 697, 708,
721 (1961).
38. Cf. LA, CIVIL CODE art. 2896 (1870) : "Every thing which is in commerce,
and which is not consumed by use, may be the object of this agreement." See
also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2448 (1870) : "Any effects of commerce may be sold,
when there exists no particular law to prohibit the traffic thereof." The French
text of the corresponding Article 2423 of the 1825 Code reads: "Tout ce qui est
dan8 le commerce. .. "
39. See Yiannopoulos, supra note 37.
40. See GIRARD, MANUEL ]Lt MENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 251-55 (1924);
SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN RECIITS 253-55 (1923);
WEISS, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 129-32 (1949).
41. See BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 107 (1939);
SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN RECHTS 253 (1923).
42. See GAIUS, INSTITUTES II. 3-9.
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tible of private ownership and those not so susceptible.4 3 Things
susceptible of private ownership are the private things. These
may belong to private persons or to the state in its capacity as
a private person. 44 Things insusceptible of private ownership
are the common things and the things of the public domain.
With regard to common things, there is only an allusion in the
French Civil Code: Article 714 declares that "there are things
which belong to nobody in particular and the use of which is
common to all. Police regulations govern the mode of their en-
joyment." This apparently refers, by implication, to the known
category of Roman law. Article 538 of the French Civil Code,
however, provides that the public domain includes the seashore
and navigable rivers, which, according to Roman conceptions,
were regarded as common things. 45 Thus, under the French Civil
Code, only air and the open sea are common things.
French writers disagree as to which things are included in
the public domain and as to the criteria for this determination.46
Article 538 of the Civil Code declares that "highways, roads, and
streets maintained by the State, navigable and floatable rivers
and streams, the seashore, alluvion and derelictions of the sea,
ports, harbors, and roadsteads, and generally all parts of French
territory which are insusceptible of private ownership, are con-
sidered to be part of the public domain." The Code, further,
enumerates as being part of the public domain "gates, walls,
trenches and bulwarks of fortified cities, and fortresses" (Ar-
ticle 540), "lands, fortifications, and bulwarks of cities which are
no longer fortified places" (Article 541), and "all property
which is vacant and without owner, and all that of persons who
die without heirs, or whose successions are abandoned" (Ar-
ticle 539).
43. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 537; 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 65, 122 (1952) ; 2 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANQAIS 68 (1897) ; 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 315
(1874-82).
44. State-owned private property (property of the private domain) is subject
to the rules of the Civil Code and does not differ from property owned by private
individuals. To the private domain of the state belong forests, alluvion, and
derelictions of the sea, buildings housing public authorities, factories, farms,
movable things, and generally, all species of property susceptible of private owner-
ship. Cf. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 145
et seq. (1952).
45. See JUSTINIAN, INSTITUTES II.1.1.
46. See 3 DUGUIT, TRAIT DE DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL 347 (1938); DEz,
TRAITt DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF 759 (1952) ; PROUDIJON, TBAITA DU DOMAINE
PUBLIC 62-63 (1834) ; 2 AunRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 50
(1897).
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French jurisprudence and doctrine have departed from the
literal wording of the Code. Some things, which according to the
Code are part of the public domain, are treated as part of the
private domain; and a number of things not mentioned in the
Code have been added to the public domain. Thus, although not
mentioned in the Code, artificial navigable waterways, except
those subject to a perpetual concession, and salt water lakes di-
rectly connected with the sea are regarded as part of the public
domain.47 On the other hand, alluvion and derelictions of the sea,
vacant estates, and fortifications no longer needed 48 are classi-
fied, contrary to the Code, as part of the private domain.
There is no general agreement in France as to the classifica-
tion of public buildings and movable things belonging to the
state. In the treatise of Planiol, the following buildings are
enumerated as part of the public domain: those which may be
regarded as accessory to territorial parts of the public domain,
such as beacons erected on the seashore, and bridges on high-
ways; those which a statute had declared to be a part of the
public domain; cemeteries and buildings dedicated to worship
or to the service of the public, such as libraries, schools, and
covered market places. 49 Public buildings housing governmental
offices are regarded as part of the private domain. The Code
seems to imply that movable state property cannot form part
of the public domain. The courts, however, have indicated that
certain movable things dedicated to the service of the public,
such as exhibits in a museum, documents in archives, and
manuscripts or books in a library are included in the public
domain.5
The German Civil Code has not included provisions estab-
lishing the categories of things insusceptible of private owner-
47. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITi PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 134,
139 (1952) ; Law of April 8, 1898, art. 35; Cass., June 24, 1842, D.1842.1.117;
S.1842.1.887.
48. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 538, 539, 541. Of. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANUAIS 141, 146, 147 (1952). The authors
suggest that the redactors of the French Civil Code did not err in having included
alluvion additions and derelictions of the sea, abandoned fortifications, and vacant
estates within the public domain; that simply, the scope of the public domain,
and the meaning of these terms, has changed since 1803.
49. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAiTt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS
141-13 (1952).
50. See Lyon Ct. of App., July 10, 1894, D.1897.1.257; S.1895.2.185; appeal
dismissed, Cass., June 17, 1896, D.1897.1.257; 8.1896.1.408. But cf. Nimes Ct.
of App., Dec. 4, 1944, D.1946 J. 28 (an army horse not a part of the public
domain).
[Vol. XXII
LOUISIANA AND THE CIVIL LAW
ship or out of commerce. It was thought that things of this
nature should be regulated exclusively by rules of public law
which had no place in a civil code. German writers, however,
for systematic purposes, include in their treatises on the Civil
Code chapters dealing with things out of commerce.5 Things
out of commerce are defined as those which, "though susceptible
of private ownership but on account of their dedication to a
public purpose, are withdrawn from the sphere of private law
in whole or in part, and, for this reason, either cannot become
subject of private relations at all or if so, to only a limited ex-
tent.' 52 To this category belong the religious things and the
public things. The things known as "common" in Roman law
are either regarded as public things or as not things at all.
Religious things (res sacrae et religiosae) are things dedi-
cated to worship. They may belong to the Church as a religious
association, to public corporations (cemeteries), or to private
persons (family plots and private churches). Ownership, how-
ever, is limited in that use contrary to the dedication is excluded.
Public things (res publicae) are things dedicated to public use.
Highways, streets, rivers, and lakes are public things if open
to the general traffic. These things may belong to the state,
other public corporations, or even to private persons. Regardless
of the owner, this type of property is subject to the provisions
of the Civil Code governing private property. Designation of a
thing as public begins with a public law act of dedication and
commencement of the public use.
The scope of ownership is limited as a result of dedication
to public use. The owner of the thing dedicated must refrain
from incompatible activities and must take all appropriate meas-
ures to facilitate public use. The Reichsgericht has indicated
that the right of the public is not confined to a mere use but
extends to the enjoyment of certain facilities and conveniences. 53
It is debatable, however, whether participation in the public use
is an individual right or merely a privilege accorded to every-
one. Limitations on ownership continue so long as the thing
is subject to public use. Public use terminates by revocation of
51. See 1 ENNECERUS-NIPPERDEY, I ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BVJRGERLICHEN
REMITS 544 (1952); LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BRGERLICHEN GESETZ-
BUCHES 368 (1957); 1 STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR zUM B.G.B. 405 (1957).
52. LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BVJRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 368
(1957).
53. See R.G. Feb. 16, 1929, 123 R.G.Z. 181, 187 (two cases); id., June 10,
1929, 125 R.G.Z. 108.
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dedication. Revocation is a public law act requiring the consent
of supervising governmental authorities. Upon termination of
the public use, ownership becomes free of all limitations.
Under the scheme of the German Civil Code, the notion of
"public domain" is avoided. Apart from certain things dedicated
to public use, state property may consist of things dedicated
to public service, such as courthouses, schools, fortifications,
prisons, and buildings housing governmental offices. These are
the "property of the administration" and belong to the state
or other public corporations. So long as public service continues,
these things may not be seized by creditors. 54 Another species
of state property consists of private property in the literal sense
(res fisci). These things serve public purposes only indirectly
and are subject to the rules of the Civil Code like any other
property held by private persons. Money and negotiable instru-
ments, state factories, state farms, and autonomous state enter-
prises which run factories, the railroads, and electricity net-
works belong to this category.
In the Greek Civil Code, the traditional classification of
things "in commerce" and "out of commerce" is retained. Article
966 declares that "things out of commerce are those common
to all, those subject to public use and those dedicated to serve
public, municipal, communal, or religious purposes." The cate-
gory of common things has only academic significance; it in-
cludes air, and, perhaps, the open sea. 55 Things of public use
are those which become dedicated either as a result of legislation
or by a private act of the owner. Article 967 indicates that
"things of public use are, particularly, freely and perpetually
running water, roads, public squares, the seashore, harbors and
roadsteads, the banks of navigable rivers, large lakes and their
shores." The list is merely illustrative. In interpreting this
article, it has been suggested that beds of navigable rivers,
though not mentioned specifically, are necessarily included by
implication.5 6 The banks of non-navigable rivers belong to the
adjacent landowners and are not subject to public use. How-
ever, inasmuch as running water is subject to public use, remote
landowners are entitled to its use and may have access to it
through ditches or pipelines. 57 According to well-settled inter-
54. Cf. R.G. Jan. 5, 1910, 72 R.G.Z. 347.
55. See BALIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIviL LAW 527 (1955) (in Greek).
56. Id. at 532.
57. Cf. GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1029, 1031.
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pretation, "large" lakes are lakes formed by running water.
Artificial lakes and lakes formed other than by perpetually
running streams are private property "in commerce." Special
legislation governs ownership of mineral waters. Things sub-
ject to public use may belong to the state, towns or communi-
ties, or even to private persons. In the latter case, enabling
legislation is necessary (Article 968). Ownership of things sub-
ject to public use is limited. Rights of ownership. may be exer-
cised only if compatible with the public use; accordingly, the
owner may be entitled to a treasure found on the land and to
all valuable minerals.
The last group of things "out of commerce" includes in a
broad sense all things dedicated to a public purpose. These
differ from things dedicated to public use in that the public
purpose served by them is not public use. Like things dedicated
to public use, these are susceptible of private ownership but only
to the exent compatible with the public purpose. In this cate-
gory belong state-owned buildings housing governmental offices,
and educational and health institutions. Municipal buildings
housing municipal offices and institutions belong to the same
category. State and municipal enterprises, whether autonomous
or not, may serve public purposes. The accepted criterion of
distinction is whether the main purpose of the enterprise is the
production of revenue or service to the public. The state owned
railroad and telecommunications systems and electric utilities
are regarded as serving a public purpose, and, therefore, are
things out of commerce. Finally, to this category belong religious
institutions and cemeteries.
The Greek Civil Code, like the German Civil Code, has
avoided the confusing notion of "public domain." State property
is, in all cases, private property within the meaning of the Civil
Code; in some instances, however, exercise of ownership rights
is limited in the interest of public use and public purpose. The
power of the state to regulate public use and public purpose is
not regarded as an incident of ownership but as authority de-
riving from the sphere of public law properly belonging to the
state.
Things out of commerce may lose this character under cer-
tain circumstances. When such is the case, all limitations on
ownership are lifted. Change of ownership occurs in only two
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instances, where islands are formed in navigable rivers and
where beds of rivers have ceased to be navigable. In these
instances the state is divested of ownership; and, according to
Articles 1071 and 1072 of the Civil Code, title belongs to the
adjacent landowners.
Corporeal and Incorporeal Things
Roman law distinguished between res corporales and res in-
corporales.58 This was a classification of objects rather than
things. Physical objects which could be felt or touched were
given as illustrations of res corporales. Res incorporales were
abstract conceptions - objects having no physical existence, but
having a pecuniary value. The illustrations given were rights
of various kinds, among them inheritance, obligations, and all
real rights with the exception of ownership. Ownership was
regarded as res corporales as a result of latent confusion between
the right of ownership and its object.50 The practical significance
of the distinction between res corporales and res incorporales
was that possession, and methods of acquiring ownership based
on possession were applicable only to material things.60 Later
in the history of Roman law, when the deficiencies of this classi-
fication became apparent the concept of quasi-possession, i.e.,
possession of real rights other than ownership, was developed.
The division of things into corporeal and incorporeal in Roman
law resulted in a sharp distinction between ownership, on the
one hand, and all other rights, on the other. Modern codes de-
veloped conceptual techniques designed to bridge this gap.
According to Article 460 of the Louisiana Civil Code, "things
are divided, in the second place, into corporeal and incorporeal." 61
Corporeal things are "such as are made manifest to the senses,
which we may touch or take, which have a body, whether ani-
mate or inanimate." The Code offers as illustrations "fruits,
corn, gold, silver, clothes, furniture, lands, meadows, woods, and
58. See GAIUS, INSTITUTES 11.12-14: "Quaedam praetera re8 corporales aunt,
quaedam incorporales. Corporales hae sunt, quae tangi possunt, velut fundus,
homo, vesti8, aurum argentum et denique alieae res innumerabilem. Incorporales
aunt, quae tangi non poasunt, qualia sunt ea, que jure consistunt, sicut hereditas,
usus fructus, obligationes quoquo modo contractae."
59. See BUCKLAND, A TEXT-OOK OF ROMAN LAW 186 (1950) ; WEISS, INSTI-
TUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 126 (1949).
60. See 1 MONIER, MANUEL ALItMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 342 (1947); 1
HUVELIN, COURS ItLAMENTAIRE DE DROIT ROMAIN 419 (1927).
61. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 460(1) (1870). Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 451
(1825) ; LA. CIVIL CODE p. 96, art. 11 (1808).
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houses.'62 Incorporeal things, on the other hand, are "such as
are not manifest to the senses, and which are conceived only by
the understanding; such as the rights of inheritance, servitudes,
and obligations. ' '63
Departing from the narrow notions of Roman law where
only tangible objects were regarded as corporeal, the Code de-
clares that perceptibility by any of the senses suffices to classify
a thing as corporeal. It is questionable, however, whether ener-
gies could be regarded as corporeal things under the Code. Per-
haps French jurisprudence and doctrine construing correspond-
ing provisions of the French Civil Code to include energies as
corporeals 64 should be followed in Louisiana. In any case, unlike
the situation in Germany and Greece,65 energies in Louisiana
are clearly objects "of riches or fortune" and should enjoy full
proprietary protection as things.66
The division of things into corporeals and incorporeals in
the Louisiana Civil Code did not, as in the Roman law, result
in a sharp distinction between the right of ownership and all
other rights. Ownership in Louisiana does not seem to be limited
to corporeal things67 and acquisition of ownership as between
the parties to a contract does not depend on transfer of posses-
62. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 460(2) (1870).
63. Id. art. 460(3). See also Succession of Sinnot, 105 La. 705, 30 So. 233
(1901) (shares of stock) ; Succession of McGuire, 151 La. 514, 92 So. 40 (1922)
(certificate of stock); Vercher v. Roy, 171 La. 524, 131 So. 658 (1930) (cer-
tificate of deposit) ; Messersmith v. Messersmith, 229 La. 495, 86 So.2d 169 (1956)
(group annuity policy) ; Merres v. Compton, 12 Rob. 76 (La. 1845) ; Miller v.
Andrus, 1 La. Ann. 237 (1846) (promissory notes) ; First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Drexler, 171 So. 151 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937) (right of succession) ; Lou-
isiana Arkansas Co. v. Louisiana Dept. of Highways, 104 So.2d 151 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1937) (right of way). Classification of negotiable instruments, insurance
policies, and certificates of deposit as "incorporeal" things is confusing. Accurate
terminology should distinguish between the paper (which is corporeal) and the
rights it evidences or embodies (which, indeed, are incorporeal). Cf. LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 1762 (1870) ; Succession of Sinnot v. Hibernia National Bank, 105 La.
705, 717, 30 So. 233, 238 (1901) ("rights must not be confounded with writings
which evidence them").
64. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAit PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 102
(1952) ; Cass., April 20, 1864, D.1864.1.178.
65. Cf. text at notes 23, 27 supra.
66. Cf. LA. CRIMINAL CODE art. 2(3) (1942) : "'Anything of value' must be
given the broadest possible construction, including any conceivable thing of the
slightest value, movable or immovable, corporeal or incorporeal, public or private.
It must be construed in the broad popular sense of the phrase, and not necesarily
as synonymous with the traditional legal term 'property.' "
67. See Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Louisiana Dept. of Highways, 104
So.2d 204 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1958) (right of way is "property"). Cf. LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 488 (1870) : "Ownership is the right by which a thing belongs to some
one in particular, to the exclusion of all other persons." Possession, however, is
1962]
774 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXII
sion and delivery. 8 However, there are a number of articles in
the Code which apply only to corporeal things."9 The distinction
is also important in connection with the division of things into
movables and immovables. 70
In France, estates (biens) are divided into things (choses,
biens corporels) and rights (droits, biens incorporels).7I This
distinction is not spelled out in the Civil Code, but is implied
in several articles. 72 The distinction has been criticized as an
"incoherent juxtaposition" of things and rights - objects which
have no common characteristics. 78 Though no longer relevant
in connection with modes of acquiring property, the distinction
carries consequences in the light of Article 2279 of the French
Civil Code; its rule that "possession is equivalent to ownership
with regard to movables" applies only to corporeal objects.74
In the German and Greek Civil Codes things are corporeal
objects only.75 As a result, ownership and other real rights may
limited to corporeal objects. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3432 (1870) : "Possession
applies properly only to corporeal things, movable or immovable. The possession
of incorporeal rights, such as servitudes and other rights of that nature, is only a
quasi possession, and is exercised by the species of possession of which these rights
are susceptible."
68. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2456 (1870).
69. The law of predial servitudes relates exclusively to corporeal immovables.
On the other hand, there are also rules in the Code which apply only to incor-
poreal things. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2481 (1870). Classification of things as
corporeal or incorporeal is particularly important in the determination of validity
of an inter vivos donation: corporeal things may become the subject of an inter
vivos donation by manual gift (art. 1539), while incorporeal things may be given
only by authentic act (art. 1536). In this context, Louisiana courts have classi-
fied shares and certificates of stock as "incorporeal." See supra note 63. The Uni-
form Stock Transfer Act (LA. R.S. 12:521-43 (1950)) has superseded Article
1536 of the Civil Code inasmuch as it applies to shares of stock. LeBlanc v.
Volker, 198 So. 398 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1940). Thus, though "incorporeal," shares
of stock may validly be the subject of an inter vivos donation by manual gift. Ibid.
70. See Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and Comparative
Law, 22 LOuISIANA LAW REVIEW 517 (1962). Cf. Hellendall, The Characteriza-
tion of Propietary Rights to Tangible Movables in the Conflict of Laws, 15 TUL.
L. REV. 374 (1941).
71. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 60
(1952). According to the prevailing doctrine in France, corporeal estates are ob-
jects of value which can be perceived through the senses. Incorporeal estates are
services and rights in general having a pecuniary value. Cf. 1 COLIN, CAPITANT
ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIhRE, TRAITt DE DROIT CIVIL 821 (1953). These authors
suggest that estates are rights rather than things. Incorporeal estates are other
than ownership rights on corporeal or incorporeal things. Corporeal estates are
ownership rights on corporeal objects.
72. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 518-525, 528 (corporeal things) ; arts. 526,
529 (incorporeal things).
73. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 60
(1952).
74. See Paris Ct. of App., Nov. 25, 1886, D.1887.2.110; Cass., Nov. 4, 1902,
D.1903.1.44; id., Nov. 25, 1929, D.H. 1930.1.3.
75. f. text at notes 22, 27 aupra.
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exist only on corporeal things. Incorporeal objects, namely,
rights having a pecuniary value, though a part of a person's
"patrimony," are not governed by the law of things.
Things Movable and Immovable
According to Article 461 of the Louisiana Civil Code, "the
third and last division of things is into movables and immov-
ables. ' '7 6 This "division" rests in part on policy considerations;
as a result, it does not always correspond with lay notions of
physical mobility. The Code defines movables and immovables,
furnishes criteria for this classification, and establishes the rule
of construction that things not classified as immovables are
movables.7 7 Immovables are subdivided into immovables by
nature, by destination, and by their object. Movables are dis-
tinguished into movables by nature and movables by the dis-
position of the law. The code provisions have been implemented
by a number of statutes and by a growing gloss of jurisprudence.
Detailed study of the Louisiana and comparative law concern-
ing movables and immovables has been made elsewhere.7 8
Other Distinctions
The preceding classification of things in the Louisiana Civil
Code is not exhaustive. Indeed, civilian tradition has developed
additional distinctions which, though not mentioned by name in
the Louisiana Civil Code, may be regarded as adopted by im-
plication. In case of a future revision of our Civil Code, these
distinctions should perhaps be considered.
Things consumable and non-consumable. Corporeal objects
are distinguished by civilian writers into consumable and non-
consumable things, depending upon whether or not they are
extinguished (or intended to be extinguished) by use. Extinc-
tion of consumable things may be the result of physical destruc-
tion (e.g., consumption of foods or drinks) or the consequence
of a juridical act (e.g., alienation of money). In all cases a
disposition takes place which cannot be repeated.7 9 Non-con-
sumable things continue to exist in spite of prolonged use (e.g.,
76. LA. Civin CODE art. 461 (1870).
77. Id. art. 475.
78. See Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and Comparative
Law, 22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 517 (1962).
79. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 61
(1952).
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furniture, houses, utensils). The distinction of things into those
consumable and those non-consumable was known in Roman
law. s° The French Civil Code8 l and the Louisiana Civil Code
8 2
have adopted this distinction by clear implication. The German
Civil Code and the Greek Civil Code contain specific provisions
and definitions.
The practical significance of this distinction in France and
Louisiana lies in the fact that only consumable things may be
the object of a loan for consumption and only non-consumable
things the object of a loan for use.88 Further, perfect usufruct
is possible only on non-consumable things, while imperfect
usufruct is possible only on consumable things. 4 Comparable
consequences attach in other civilian systems. In the absence of
definition in the Civil Code, characterization of a thing as con-
sumable or non-consumable in France and Louisiana properly
belongs to doctrine and jurisprudence. According to prevailing
French doctrine, which may be relevant for Louisiana also, this
is a factual determination depending on the inherent nature
of things. Things which according to their nature cannot be-
come the object of a prolonged right of enjoyment, i.e., things
80. See JUSTINIAN INSTITUTES II.D.B. ". . . quae ipso usu consumuntur
quo numero sunt vinum oleum frumentum vestimenta. quibus proxima est pecunia
numerata: namque in ipso usu adsidua permutatione quodamnodo extinguitur."
81. FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 587, 589, 1531-32, 1565-66.
82. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2896 (1870) : "Everything . . . which is not consumed
by use . . . ." See also id. art. 2678, notes 83-84 infra.
83. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1874; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2891 (1870). Cf.
New York Fire Ins. Co. v. Kansas Milling Co., 227 La. 976, 81 So. 2d 15 (1955)
(ox: loan for use) ; Reehlman v. Calamari, 94 So.2d 311 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1957) (automobile: loan for use) ; Egerton v. Buckner, 4 Rob. 346 (La. 1843)
(bank notes: loan for consumption).
84. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 587, 589, LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 533, 534
(1870). See Succession of Franklin, 13 La. App. 289, 127 So. 767 (1930) (jewelry:
"perfect usufruct") ; Succession of Bickham, 197 So. 924 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1940) ; Danna v. Danna, 161 So. 348 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1935) ; Mariana v.
Eureka Homestead Soc., 181 La. 125, 158 So. 642 (1935) (money: "imperfect
usufruct") ; Succession of Block, 137 La. 302, 68 So. 618 (1915) ; Miguez v. Del-
cambre, 125 La. 176, 51 So. 108 (1910) (promissory notes: "imperfect usufruct") ;
Johnson v. Bolt, 146 So. 375 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1933) (negotiable instruments:
"imperfect usufruct") ; Vivian State Bank v. Thomason-Lewis Lumber Co., 162
La. 660, 111 So. 51 (1926) (certificate of time deposit: "imperfect usufruct") ;
Comment, Usufruct of a Promissory Note, Perfect or Imperfect?, 4 TUL. L. REV.
104 (1929) ; Note, Building and Loan Stock: The Subject Matter of a Perfect or
an Imperfect Usufruct?, 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 335 (1958). Usufruct of
shares of stock has been held to be a "perfect usufruct." Leury v. Mayer, 122
La. 486, 47 So. 839 (1908). Thus, by implication, shares of stock have been
classified as non-consumable. Cf. Kelley v. Kelley, 185 La. 185, 168 So. 769 (1936)
(the court conceding, "but without deciding," that shares of stock and bonds were
the object of an "imperfect usufruct").
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extinguished by the first use,85 are characterized as consumable.
The particular thing is examined in isolation, without the neces-
sity of a comparison with other things.80 According to Article
92 of the German Civil Code "consumable things, within the
meaning of the law, are movables the intended use of which
consists in their consumption or alienation. Movable things
which belong to a stock of goods or to any other aggregate of
things the intended use of which consists in the alienation of
the single objects are likewise considered to be consumable."
Articles 951 and 952 of the Greek Civil Code contain provisions
similar in substance.8 7 German and Greek doctrine and juris-
prudence interpret these articles to mean that determination
of the character of a thing as consumable or non-consumable
depends on objective criteria and prevailing notions in trade
rather than actual use.8 Food, drink, and raw materials are
destined to be consumed and are clearly consumable per se.
Clothes, however, are not consumable because they are not
destined to be consumed; their deterioration and ultimate de-
struction is the result of use rather than their destination.
Money and goods destined to be alienated, or the utility of which
consists in their alienation, are assimilated to things consumable
per se. The distinction has practical consequences as to legal
relations concerning the use of things. Depending upon char-
acterization of things as consumable or not consumable, one
may be under a duty to return either specific things or things
of like quantity and quality.
Things fungible and non-fungible. Another important classi-
fication of things is into fungibles and non-fungibles. The
criterion for this distinction is the possibility of replacement
85. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITi PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 62,
64 (1952). In Roman law, however, the category of consumable things was
broader as it included things subject to deterioration rather than extinction by the
first use (e.g., clothes). Cf. supra note 80.
86. Jaubert, Deum notions du droit des biens: la consomptibilitd et la fongibilitd,
[1945] REv. TRIM. DR. Civ. 75.
87. According to Article 951 of the Greek Civil Code "Consumable things are
those movable things the intended use of which consists in their being consumed."
The following Article 952 provides that "Likewise consumable are those movables
the intended use of which consists in alienation. Such are especially coins and
bank notes, matured interest and dividend coupons, as well as movable things
which without being consumable per se are part of a commercial establishment or
of any aggregate of things and are destined to be alienated individually."
88. See BALIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 493 (1955) ; 1 ENNECCERUS-
NIPPERDEY, 1 ALLGEMEINER TErL DES BORGERLICHEN RECHTS 505 (1952) ; LEH-
MANN, ALLGEMEINEE TEL DES B-RGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 359 (1957);
SOKOLWsIu, DIE PHILOSOPHIE Im PRIVATRECHT 383 (1902); 1 STAUDINGER,
KOMMENTAR zum B.G.B. 434 (1957).
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of one thing by another. Things which according to law or the
intention of the parties may be regarded as interchangeable are
termed fungible; things which are not interchangeable are non-
fungible. Ordinarily, fungible things occur in trade in terms of
numbers, weight, or measure. Characterization of things in that
regard may involve comparison with other things.8 9
This distinction has its foundation in Roman law.90 The
German and Greek Civil Codes clearly distinguish between
fungibles and non-fungibles, whereas the French and the Lou-
isiana Civil Codes have adopted this distinction only by implica-
tion. The word "fungibles" occurs in the French Civil Code
and in the French text of the Louisiana Civil Code in connection
with compensation."' In several other articles reference is made
to fungibles by description rather than by use of this term.2
In certain instances, however, the redactors of the Louisiana
Civil Code seem to have confused fungible things with consum-
able things and have regarded as fungible those things destined
to be consumed by use.9 3 The same error was made by the
redactors of the French Civil Code who relied heavily on the
texts of Domat and Pothier.9 4 Indeed, quite frequently, things
which are fungible are also consumable. But this is not neces-
sarily so, for there are things which are fungible without being
consumable (e.g., books of the same edition) and things which
are consumable without being fungible (e.g., wine of a par-
ticular vintage). In any case, as the two characteristics fre-
89. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 63
(1952) ; Jaubert, Deux notions du droit des biens: la consomptibilitd et la fongi-
bilit, [1945] REV. TRIM. DR. CIv. 75.
90. See PAULUS, DIGEST XII.1.2.2: "Mutui datio consistit in his rebus, quae
pondere numero mensura consistunt."
91. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1291; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2205 (1825)
"La compensation n' a lieu qu'entre deux dettes qui ont dgalement pour objet une
somme d'argent, ou une certaine quantitd de choses fongibles de la mgme esp~ce,
et qui sont dgalement liquides et exigibles." In the corresponding Article 2209 of
the 1870 Code, the word "fongibles" is translated as "consumable."
92. See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2458-2459 (1870) (sale of goods by weight,
tale, or measure).
93. See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2896, 2910 (1870). Cf. supra note 91.
Article 2910 of the Louisiana Civil Code should refer to "fungibles" rather than
"things which are consumed by the use." Cf. GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 806: "By
the contract of loan one party to the transaction transfers to the other party the
ownership of money or of other fungible things, and the borrower is under obliga-
tion to return to him other things of the same quantity and quality."
94. See, e.g., FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1874, 1875, 1892; 9 DEMOLOMBE,
TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 23 (1874-82). Cf. POTHIER, TRAITA DES
OBLIGATIONS, 1 OEUVRES DE POTHIER 191 (1830) ; DOMAT, LES LoIx CIVILES
DANS LEUR ORDRE NATUREL 78 (1777) ; DUTCH CIVIL CODE art. 561 (1838)
SPANISH CIVIL CODE art. 337 (1889).
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quently coincide, this confusion of concepts has not caused sub-
stantial practical difficulties.9 5
French writers do not agree as to whether the quality of a
thing as fungible or non-fungible depends upon its nature or
upon the intention of the parties. According to Demolombe in-
tention controlsY6 According to other commentators, while inten-
tion may be relevant, it is indispensable that a thing should, by
its nature, be susceptible of determination by weight, tale, or
measure in order to qualify as fungible; for example, the inten-
tion of the parties may not render a house fungibleY7 In France
and in Louisiana, the distinction of things as fungible or non-
fungible is significant in the field of obligations. Obligations
having as their object things determined by quantity and
quality9" ("genre," "genus") and obligations having as their
object a thing determined individually99 ("corps certain,"
"species") concern, respectively, fungible and non-fungible
things.'lo
According to Article 92 of the German Civil Code, "fungible
things in the legal sense are movable things which in trade are
generally determined by number, measure or weight," The Greek
Civil Code contains a similar definition. 101 According to settled
interpretation in Germany and Greece, the quality of a thing as
fungible or non-fungible is determined by reference to objective
criteria and notions prevailing in trade. 0 2 As in France and in
Louisiana, the distinction is important in the field of obliga-
tions, particularly in connection with the contracts of loan,
deposit, and annuity. Responsibility for loss or deterioration
95. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITit PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 64
(1952).
96. See 9 DEMOLOMiE, TRAITE DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 23 (1874-82).
97. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 64
(1952).
98. See, e.g., LA CIVIL CODE art. 2156 (1870). See also id. arts. 1886, 1915,
2219. Cf. Comment, The Sale by Weight, Count, or Measure, 5 LOUISIANA LAW
REVIEW 293 (1943) ; Comment, Determination of the Donations inter vivos for the
Purpose of Computing the Mass of a Succession, 12 TUL. L. REV. 262, 269 (1938).
99. See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2150, 2151 2155 (1870). Cf. id. art. 1909.
Cf. ULPIAN, DIGEST XXX 30.6: "Si legetur pecunia quae in area est, vel vinum,
quod in apotheca est, et cet. species legetur. et cet."
100. Cf. Comment, Supervening Impossibility as a Discharge of an Obligation,
21 TuL. L. REV. 603 (1947).
101. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 950: "Fungible things are those movables
which in trade are ordinarily determined by number, measure, or weight."
102. See BALs, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 492 (1955) (in Greek);
1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, 1 ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BtRGERLICHEN RECHTS 504
(1952) ; See LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BtRGERLICIEN GESETZBUCHES 358
(1957).
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of a fungible thing is discharged by the delivery of another
similar thing, while with regard to non-f ungibles a money judg-
ment is the only permissible substitute. The distinction of things
into fungible and non-fungible corresponds to the distinction
of obligations having as their object a genus and those having
as their object a species, an individually determined thing. In
that regard, however, classification of a thing as fungible or
non-fungible depends upon the intention of the parties rather
than upon objective criteria. 1 3
Things divisible and indivisible. The distinction of things
into those divisible and those indivisible has been termed "one
of the most abstract and most obscure matters of civil law.' ' I0 4
Indeed, "divisibility" is a juridical abstraction which does not
always correspond with lay notions. In Roman law, things were
divisible if they could be divided into several parts of the same
kind as the whole without thereby suffering diminution in
value. 0 5 Characterization of a thing as divisible or indivisible
was important in judicial partition, for depending on the divisi-
bility of things, substantially different methods of procedure
were available.
The French and the Louisiana Civil Code refer to divisibility
in a number of articles. 106 As in Roman law, the issue of
divisibility is important in connection with judicial partition.
Divisible things may be partitioned in kind while indivisible
things are subject to partition only by licitation. The Louisiana
Civil Code declares that a thing is indivisible "when a diminution
of its value, or loss or inconvenience of one of the owners, would
be the consequence of dividing it. '1 I 7 There is no corresponding
article in the French Civil Code.
103. See 1 STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUTm B.G.B. 430 (1957).
104. 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITIt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENs 26 (1874-82).
105. See SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES RI5MISCHEN RECHTS 259
(1923). The division of things into "ideal parts" is a different problem since it
concerns division of the right over a thing rather than division of the thing itself.
Co-ownership of ideal parts (communio pro indiviso) can exist with respect to
both divisible and indivisible things. In all cases of co-ownership, the share of each
co-owner is distinct and certain but only intellectually discernible (intellectu magis
quam corpore). Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 494 (1870).
106. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 826, 827, 1872; LA. CIVIL CODE arts.
1339, 1340, 2980 (1870).
107. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1340 (1870). The Louisiana Supreme Court has
held that "Whether the partition be ordered in kind or by licitation is dependent
on the nature of the estate, and by the settled jurisprudence, partition in kind,
favored 'by the law, should be ordered in all cases where the property is divisible
unless such division would cause diminution of value or loss, or inconvenience."
Lasyone v. Emerson, 220 La. 951, 959, 57 So.2d 906, 909 (1952). Buildings are
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The German and the Greek Civil Codes deal with divisibility
in connection with the institution of co-ownership (Gemeinschaft,
communio). According to Article 752 of the German Civil Code,
partition in kind is available as to things which, without diminu-
tion in value, can be divided in equal parts corresponding to
the shares of the co-owners.1 8 Article 800 of the Greek Civil
Code contains a similar provision. 109 According to settled doc-
trine in both countries, tracts of land are always divisible in
kind. Buildings may be susceptible of vertical division in kind,
if they have several entrances; horizontal division of buildings
is possible under the Greek Civil Code only by amicable parti-
tion.10 As a rule, movables are indivisible; divisible are those
whose value consists in their substance rather than form and
those consisting of a mass of similar things (e.g., grain).
Single and composite things; aggregates and universalities.
Civilian scholars, elaborating on Roman law sources, distinguish
things into those single (res singulares, corpus continuum, cor-
pus quod uno spiritu continentur) and those composite (corpus
compositum, corpus quod ex contingentibus constat, universitas
rerun cohaerentium)."' Single things are natural objects which
not susceptible of horizontal division. Ibid. Whether land can be partitioned in
kind depends on its nature, the character of improvements thereon, adaptability
of land to farming purposes, accessibility of lots to highways, and a number of
other considerations. Pryor v. Desha, 204 La. 575, 15 So.2d 891 (1944). See
also Bordelon v. Sterkx, 237 La. 612, 111 So.2d 791 (1959) ; Cain v. Boudosque,
227 La. 333, 79 So.2d 328 (1955) ; Oliver v. Robinson, 221 La. 658, 60 So.2d 76
(1952). A partition in kind is said to result in a diminution of the value of the
property when the total value of the lots is less than the value of the tract as a
whole. Babineaux v. Babineaux, 237 La. 806, 814, n.4, 112 So.2d 620, 622, n.4
(1959). Whether land should be divided in kind or by licitation is thus reduced
to "a question of fact to be decided by the judge before whom the partition pro-
ceedings are tried." Green v. Small, 227 La. 401, 79 So. 497 (1955). Mines and
known mineral lands are indivisible in kind. Sellwood v. Phillips, 185 La. 1045,
171 So. 440 (1936); Gulf Refining Co. v. Hayne, 138 La. 555, 70 So. 509
(1915) ; Demegre, Co-ownership of Oil and Gas Interests in Louisiana, 24 TL.
L. REV. 288, 290 (1950). Cf. Comment, Circumstances under which Partition is
Available and Procedure for Securing It as They Developed Historically, 8 TuL.
L. REV. 574 (1934).
108. See GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 752: "The dissolution of the community is
effected by partition in kind, if the object held in common, or in case several
objects are held in common, the latter may without diminution in value, be divided
in equal parts corresponding to the shares of the co-owners. The division of equal
parts among the co-owners takes place by drawing lots."
109. "Partition is made in kind if the objects to be partitioned, one or more,
may be divided in similar parts corresponding to the shares of the co-owners,
without diminution in value."
110. See GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 1002. In Germany, Article 93 of the Civil
Code blocked recognition of ownership in individual apartments. Special legisla-
tion was enacted, however, which permitted contractual and judicial horizontal
division of buildings. See Law of March 15, 1951, 1 B.G. bl. 175 (1951).
111. This distinction is merely systematic and has not become the object of
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according to physical, though not necessarily scientific, notions
appear as one thing (e.g., stones, pieces of metal, wood, organic
matter). Objects which have trade value only in certain quan-
tities (e.g., grain) are also single things. Composite things con-
sist of several single things ("component parts") which have
lost their individuality and are regarded as one thing while their
association lasts (e.g., a piece of furniture, a car, a ship). The
distinction of things into single and composite is important in
the light of consequences attaching to things characterized as
component parts.
The component parts of a composite thing are either "essen-
tial" or "non-essential." Essential component parts are those
which cannot be separated from each other without destruction
of one part or another or without essential change in their sub-
stance. In general, factual relations of things and prevailing so-
cietal notions determine lines of demarcation. The significance
of classifying a thing as an essential component part is that, so
long as the association lasts, this thing is not an object of sep-
arate real rights and follows the principal thing in all cases of
alienation or encumbrance. Non-essential component parts, on
the other hand, are objects of separate real rights but they
follow the principal thing in the absence of provision to the con-
trary." 2 The French and the Louisiana Civil Codes refer to this
distinction only by implication. 1 3 The German Civil Code" 4 and
the Greek Civil Code" 5 contain provisions defining the words
"essential component parts" and establishing the consequences
of characterization.
Composite things are distinguishable from so-called "aggre-
gates of things" (corpus ex distantibus, universitates rerun dis-
specific provisions in civil codes. See BAIrS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW
474 (1955) (in Greek) ; 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 28
(1874-82); 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, 1 ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BYEtGERLICHEN
RECHTS 506 (1952); LEHMANN, ALLOEMEINER TEIL DES BtRGERLICHEN GESETZ-
BUCHEs 349 (1957); WEISS, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN PRIVATRECHTS 132
(1949).
112. See Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and Compara-
tive Law, 22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 517 (1962). Roman law did not recognize
separate real rights on component parts. Buildings and plants were considered
component parts of the ground and, therefore, insusceptible of separate ownership.
Ownership over things which became component parts of other things became
dormant for the period of association but could revive upon separation unless
extinguished by acquisitive prescription.
113. FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 518-20, 523, 546; LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 464-7,
498 (1870).
114. GERMAN CIVIL CODE arts. 93-96.
115. GREEK CIVIL CODE arts. 953-55.
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tantium, universitates facti).116 These aggregates are composed
of several similar or dissimilar, single or composite things which
because of their common destination are regarded in trade as
one thing (e.g., a herd, an art collection). In these circum-
stances, the several individual things do not lose their identity
and continue having an independent juridical existence. The
aggregate as such is not a thing, nor does it have a juridical
existence of its own, but exists only in fact. Consequently, own-
ership rights operate only on the several individual things and
not upon the aggregate. The aggregate may become the object
of obligations but never the object of real transactions. Aggre-
gates of things should not be confused with universalities of
rights and things (e.g., patrimony)." I7 These are juridical en-
tities distinct from the several rights and things of which they
are composed. Universalities are not things; however, unlike
aggregates, which exist only in fact, universalities exist both in
fact and in law. They are particularly important in the field of
successions and obligations."1
8
Things principal and accessory. The traditional distinction
into things principal and accessory rests on the observation that
things which preserve their identity may exist in a relationship
of coordination (e.g., spoon and fork) or in a relationship of
subordination (e.g., house and key). In the second relationship,
the subordinate thing is called an accessory. Accessories are de-
fined by civilian writers and by certain modern codes to be
things which, without being component parts of a principal
thing, are nevertheless destined to serve its economic purpose."19
Article 567 of the French Civil Code and Article 522 of the
116. See BALIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 475 (1955) (in Greek) ;
9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE DISTINCTION DES BIENS 29 (1874-82) ; 1 ENNECCERTUS-
NIPPERDEY, 1 ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES B(IRGERLICHEN RECHTS 501 (1952) ; SOHM-
MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN lECHTS 251 (1923).
117. 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAITt DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 29 (1874-82);
PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 19 et seq., 59
(1952).
118. Cf. FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 870, 874, 1009, 1024; LA. CIVIL CODE arts.
1427, 1434, 1611, 1642 (1870). Cf. Succession of Jurisich, 224 La. 325, 69 So.2d
361 (1954).
119. See 9 DEMOLOMBE, TRAIT] DE LA DISTINCTION DES BIENS 27 (1874-82).
Of. GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 97; GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 956. In Louisiana, fruits,
natural and civil, not yet separated from the principal thing are not accessories
but component parts. See Baird v. Brown, 28 La. Ann. 842 (1876) (growing
crops) ; Carmouche v. Jung, 157 La. 441, 102 So. 518 (1925) (rents not reserved
by landlord making sale of premises during term of lease, and which accrue after
sale belong to the purchaser). Batture and alluvion are also clearly parts of the
ground. Meyers v. Mathis, 42 La. Ann. 471, 7 So. 605 (1890). Minerals are part
of the ground; and mineral rights are incidents of ownership; thus, in the absence
of reservation, mineral rights are included in the act of sale. George v. Manhattan
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Louisiana Civil Code indicate that accessories are things united
to a principal thing for its "use, ornament, or completion." Sev-
eral articles in the French and in the Louisiana Civil Code refer
to the consequences of the characterization of a thing as acces-
sory.1 20 Ordinarily, party intention, factual relations of things,
and prevailing conceptions in society determine which things are
principal and which accessories. Characterization of a thing as
accessory means that in certain instances the accessory follows
the principal thing. But while essential component parts follow
the principal thing always, accessories follow the principal thing
only in enumerated instances and in the absence of a contrary
intention of the parties.
1 2
Land & Fruit Co., 51 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1931) ; Powell v. Roy, 14 La. App. 663,
130 So. 629 (2d Cir. 1930). Standing timber has been held to be an "accessory"
of the land sold. Wollums v. Hewitt, 142 La. 597, 77 So. 295 (1918). Cf. Cousins
v. Cusachs, 6 La. App. 837 (1927). Standing timber, however, should be regarded
as a component part of the ground rather than an accessory. LA. CIviL CODM
art. 465 (1870). The sale of standing timber in Louisiana has the effect of creat-
ing two separate and distinct immovables. Brown v. Hodge-Hunt Lumber Co.,
162 La. 635, 110 So. 886 (1926) ; LA. R.S. 9:1103 (1950). In these circum-
stances, timber is no longer a component part of the ground. Gray v. Edgar
Lumber Co., 138 La. 906, 70 So. 877 (1916) (sale of land does not carry title to
timber already sold). It is a different problem, however, where the landowner
commits himself to convey both land and timber by general warranty deed. In
this case, the landowner will be held liable on his warranty. Young v. Sartor,
152 La. 1064, 95 So. 223 (1923). Cf. Bodsaw Lumber Co. v. Cliffton Heirs, 169
La. 759, 126 So. 52 (1930) ; Mower v. Richardson, 124 La. 130, 49 So. 1003
(1909).
120. Cf. FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 624, 696, 1018, 1019, 1615, 1692; LA. CrvmL
CODE arts. 613, 771, 1636, 1637, 2461, 2490, 2645 (1870). Article 2461 of the
Louisiana Civil Code declares that "the sale of a thing includes that of its acces-
sories, and of whatever has been destined for its constant use, unless there be a
reservation to the contrary." In interpreting this article, the Louisiana Supreme
Court has held that a derrick anchor and certain spare parts of a dredge were
"absolutely necessary to the successful operation" of the dredge, and, therefore,
its accessories. Louisiana Contracting Co. v. Board of Commissioners of Port of
New Orleans, 150 La. 559, 574, 91 So. 43 (1922). Similarly, a fence has been
held to be "an integral and essential part of a going plantation." Bagley v. Rose
Hill Sugar Co., 111 La. 249, 277, 35 So. 539 (1903). Cf. New Orleans S.F. &
L.R.R. v. Delamore, 114 U.S. 501 (1885) (right of way and franchise accessories
of a business). Louisiana courts have not developed a generally applicable test for
the characterization of a thing as principal or accessory. Ordinarily, characteriza-
tion is made in concrete instances by reference to party intention or on the basis
of economic considerations and factual relations of things. For this reason, the
scattered decisions bearing on this issue cannot be taken to establish a general
rule. Accessories in Louisiana may be corporeal or incorporeal. See, e.g., Partout
v. Lewis, 51 La. Ann. 210, 25 So. 134 (1899) (servitude: includes certain acces-
sory rights) ; National Collection Service Inc. v. Woodward, 111 So.2d 189 (La.
App. 1959) (materialman's lien and privilege are included in the sale of credit) ;
Clarck v. Warner, 6 La. Ann. 408 (1851); Madison v. Zabrinskie, 11 La. 247
(1837) (actions relating to the enjoyment of a thing sold pass with the sale).
The vendee, however, has no right of action against third parties for damages to
the thing before his acquisition of title. Matthews v. Alsworth, 45 La. Ann. 465,
12 So. 518 (1893). Similarly, an insurance policy on a thing sold does not pass
with the sale. King v. Preston, 11 La. Ann. 95 (1856).
121. Buildings and other improvements, whether classified as immovables by
nature or immovables by destination, are component parts of the ground. Title to
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Principal things and their fruits. French and Louisiana civil
law. In the French Civil Code and in the Louisiana Civil Code,1 22
fruits are dealt with as particular instances of the right of acces-
sion within the institutional framework of ownership. Fruits,
however, are things (i.e., corporeal objects and incorporeal eco-
nomic advantages) derived from, or produced by, things. For
systematic reasons, therefore, analysis of the notion of fruits
in Louisiana and comparative law is undertaken at this point.
23
The provisions of the Louisiana Civil Code concerning fruits
are almost identical with those of the French Civil Code. Both
codes distinguish natural fruits, fruits of industry, and civil
fruits. Natural fruits are "the spontaneous product of the earth"
and "the product and increase of cattle."'' 2 4 Fruits of industry
are those "obtained by cultivation" as a result of "industry be-
stowed on a piece of ground.' 125 Civil fruits are "rents of real
property, the interest of money, and annuities," as well as "all
other kinds of revenue derived from property by the operation
of the law or private agreement."' 12 6 Neither the French Civil
Code nor the Louisiana Civil Code defines the generic term
"fruits." The definition accepted by courts and writers in France
is that fruits are things which are produced periodically by a
the land, therefore, carries title to buildings and other improvements. Prevot v.
Courtney, 241 La. 313, 129 So.2d 1 (1961); Green v. Small, 227 La. 401, 79
So.2d 497 (1955); Bacque v. Darby, 69 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1954). See also
Smith v. Bell, 224 La. 1, 68 So.2d 737 (1954) (immovables by destination pass
with the sale of land as accessories under Article 2461 of the Civil Code). Dicta
in these cases indicate that title to buildings and improvements may be "reserved"
by the conveying landowner, by express contractual provision. Old cases, how-
ever, indicate that this is not possible. Boyle v. Swanson, 6 La. Ann. 263 (1851).
Of. Lasyone v. Emerson, 220 La. 951, 57 So.2d 906 (1952). If a landowner may
validly reserve title to buildings and improvements while conveying lands, then,
contrary to the Lasyone case, horizontal division of immovable property is pos-
sible in Louisiana. Cf. Yiannopoulos, Movables and Immovables in Louisiana and
Comparative Law, 22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 517 (1962).
122. FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 546-50; LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 498-503 (1870).
123. Several continental writers, following the method of the Pandectists and
the scheme of the German Civil Code, deal with fruits in the general parts of
their treatises. See BALIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 517 (1955) (in
Greek); 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, 1 ALLGEMEINER TIL DES BORGERLICHEN
RECHTS 537 (1952); LEHMANN, ALLORMEINER TEIL DES BURGERLICHEN GESETZ-
RUCHES 364 (1957); 1 SOERGEL-SIEBERT, BtROERLICIIES GESETZBUCH 350 (1959).
Cf. 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 63 (1957).
124. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 583(1); LA. CIVIL CODE art. 545(1) (1870).
125. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 583(2); LA. CIVIL CODE art. 545(2) (1870).
126. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 584; LA. CIVIL CODE art. 545(3), (4) (1870).
Of. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 499 (1879) : "[T]he revenues yielded by property from
the operation of the law or by agreement." Natural and industrial fruits derive
from the 'body of the principal thing, the first spontaneously and the second as a
result of cultivation. Civil fruits do not derive from the body of the principal thing
but result from legal relations having as their object the principal thing.
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principal thing without diminution of its substance. 12 7 This def-
inition distinguishes fruits from "products" (produits). In a
technical sense, products are things derived from a principal
thing whose substance is thereby diminished. Once separated,
products are not reproduced. The significance of this distinction
in French law is that, in this way, the rights of certain persons
entitled to receive "fruits" are confined to revenues produced
by a thing periodically and without diminution of its substance.
Correspondingly, the owner of a thing is accorded the right to
obtain all products. 28 This conceptual technique carries signifi-
cant practical consequences in connection with the status of
timber and mineral substances extracted from the ground. The
French regard stones extracted from a quarry not regularly
exploited and trees cut down without any plan of exploitation
as "products.' 1 29 The products of a regularly exploited quarry
or forest, however, are considered to be fruits.8 0 The result in
the last instance is based on Article 598 (1) of the French Civil
Code which has been interpreted as extending the notion of
fruits to include component parts of the ground obtained in
certain circumstances.'-' This much broader conception of fruits
is said to correspond with the intention of the owner and the
destination of a thing."$2 Obtaining parts of the substance of a
thing becomes the subject matter of a particular legal relation.
As is the case with accessories, fruits and products ordinarily
follow the juridical situation of the principal thing. The owner
of the principal thing acquires, by his own right, the ownership
of fruits and products. 3' Revendication of a principal thing by
127. See 2 CARBON NIER, DROIT CIVIL 63 (1957) ; 3 PLANIOL ET RIIPERT, TRAIT
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS 255 (1952).
128. Indeed, the broad language of a number of articles in the French Civil
Code, conferring upon persons such as a usufructuary and a possessor in good
faith the right to derive "fruits," needed to be limited to revenues produced
periodically and without diminution of the substance of the principal thing. Cf.
text at notes 135, 136 infra.
129. See 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 64 (1957) (interpretation based on
Articles 598(2) and 592 of the French Civil Code). Of. 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT,
TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS 256 (1952).
130. See 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 64 (1957) (interpretation based on
Articles 598 and 591 of the French Civil Code). For an analysis of French law
concerning "regulated felling" of timber, see also Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co.,
145 La. 96, 110, 81 So. 769 (1919).
131. "He [the usufructuary] has also the enjoyment, in the same way as the
owner, of mines and quarries which are being worked, when the usufruct begins."
132. See 1 COLIn-CAPITANT ET JULLIOT DE LA MORANDIkRE, TuAiTr DE DROIT
CIVIL 967, 969 (1953); 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL
FRANgAIS 770 (1952); 2 AuBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS 689
(1897) ; Comment, Usufructuary's Right to the Proceeds of Oil and Gas Wells in
Louisiana, 2 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 169, 172 (1939).
133. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 546, 1614 (2). Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art.
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a dispossessed owner includes, ordinarily, fruits and products." 4
A possessor in good faith, however, is entitled to keep the fruits
he has earned. 18 5 In certain circumstances, principal things and
fruits are disassociated and their juridical situation is no longer
the same. In these circumstances, fruits do not follow the own-
ership of the principal thing, though products still do. Thus,
when a usufruct is established, the fruits belong to the usufruc-
tuary though the owner retains the right to the acquisition of
products."36 And, in connection with the administration of the
estate of an incompetent, alienation of fruits is regarded as an
act of administration, while alienation of the principal or prod-
ucts an act of disposition subject to special formalities."37
In interpreting the corresponding provisions of the Louisiana
Civil Code, in this area, Louisiana courts have frequently fol-
lowed French doctrine and jurisprudence. The distinction be-
tween "fruits" and "products," however, has not be adopted in
Louisiana. On the contrary, Louisiana courts have declared that
the word "products" has the same meaning as the word
"fruits. 1" 8 As a result, a different conceptual apparatus has had
to be employed in apportioning economic advantages between the
owner of a thing and other persons entitled to fruits. The courts
have been faced with these questions, quite typically, in cases
involving rights of a usufructuary, a possessor in good or bad
faith, and in cases involving problems of community property
and taxation. 139
With regard to the usufructuary, Louisiana courts estab-
ished the proposition that under Article 533 of the Civil Code
498 (1870) ; Manuel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 So. 548 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1932).
134. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 549, 1936. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 502
(1870).
135. See note 134 supra.
136. See FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 582. Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 533 (1870).
137. See 2 CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL 64 (1957). Cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 350
(1870), repealed by Acts 1960, No. 30, § 2; replaced by LA. CODE OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE arts. 4261, 4262 (1960) ; Stewart v. Crump, 131 La. 463, 59 So. 903
(1912) (minor's estate; distinction between capital and revenue).
138. See Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96, 81 So. 769 (1919) ; Elder
v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914). See also Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Gray, 159 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1947) ; United States v. Harang, 165
F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1947). But cf. Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773,
57 So.2d 679 (1952), infra text at note 157.
139. The notion of fruits is important in Louisiana law in connection with
a variety of other problems. See, e.g., LA. CIVIL CODE art. 466 (1870) (seizure) ;
Manuel v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 139 So. 548 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1932)
(insurance) ; Derouen v. LeBleu, 18 So. 2d 207 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1944) ; LA.
CIVIL CODE art. 2506 (1870) (rights of an evicted possessor) ; DaPonte v. Ogden,
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fruits are only things "born and reborn of the soil.' ' 140 Accord-
ingly, the usufructuary is not entitled to products resulting from
a depletion of the land such as timber 14 1 and mineral sub-
stances,'142 except as provided for in Articles 551 and 552 of the
Civil Code. 4 3 In the case of King v. Buffington,14 the Louisiana
Supreme Court declared that royalties, delay rentals, and bo-
nuses, deriving from a mineral lease granted after the commence-
ment of a usufruct, are neither natural nor civil fruits, and
therefore, that these economic advantages belong to the naked
owner. In the same decision the Supreme Court indicated that
a usufructuary should be entitled to the proceeds from mines
and quarries 145 only "if they were actually worked before the
commencement of the usufruct" in accordance with the provi-
161 La. 378, 108 So. 777 (1926) ; Stewart v. Crump, 131 La. 463, 59 So. 903
(1912); Toler v. Bunch, 34 La. Ann. 997 (1882) ; Balfour's Heirs v. Balfour,
33 La. Ann. 297 (1881) Becnel v. Becnel, 23 La. Ann. 150 (1871) ; Gosselin v.
Abat, 3 La. 549 (1832) ; Perez v. Guitard, 14 OA. App. 191 (1917) (relations of
co-owners). Distinction between fruits and products, however, is not necessary for
the solution of these problems.
140. See Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914). See also Gueno v.
Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 1089, 117 So.2d 817, 819, 820 (1960) : "The usufructuary
of land, having only a perfect usufruct, has only the right to the natural fruits of
the land and such civil fruits as are described and treated in Articles 544 through
554 of the Civil Code. The right to consume the substance of the land is not
permitted, save in the exceptional instance hereinafter pointed out"; LA. CIVIL
CODE art. 533 (1870) : "Usufruct is the right of enjoying a thing, the property
of which is vested in another, and to draw from the same all the profit, utility
and advantages which it may produce, provided it be without altering the sub-
stance of the thing. . . . The obligation of not altering the substance of the
thing takes place only in the case of perfect usufruct."
141. See Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914).
142. See King v. Buffington, 240 La. 955, 126 So.2d 326 (1961) ; Gueno v.
Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 117 So.2d 817 (1960). But cf. Milling v. Collector of
Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So.2d 679 (1952) (bonuses and royalties are civil
fruits; community property and taxation) ; Note, Mineral Rights- Oil Royalties
as Fruits, 12 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 491 (1952).
143. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 551 (1870) : "The usufructuary has a right to draw
all the profits which are usually produced by the thing subject to the usufruct.
Accordingly he may cut trees on land of which he has the usufruct, take from it
earth, stones, sand and other materials, but for his use only, and for the ameliora-
tion and cultivation of the land, provided he act in that respect as a prudent
administrator, and without abusing this right." Id. art. 552: "The usufructuary
has a right to the enjoyment and proceeds of mines and quarries in the land sub-
ject to the usufruct, if they were actually worked before the commencement of the
usufruct; but he has no right to mines and quarries not opened." See Sachse,
The Mineral Rights of the Usufructuary, 1 LA. B.J. 25 (1954) ; Comment, Mineral
Lease on Land Subject to Usufruct, 34 TUL. L. REV. 784 (1959) ; Comment,
Usufructuary's Right to the Proceeds of Oil and Gas Wells in Louisiana, 2 Lou-
ISIANA LAW REVIEW 169 (1939).
144. 240 La. 955, 126 So.2d 326 (1961). According to the holding of the
court, the naked owner retains the right to search for minerals and may validly
grant a lease. Mineral operations, however, are not to be exercised in a manner
detrimental to the usufructuary.
145. "That exploration for oil and gas is mining within the meaning of our law
is no longer an open question." Gueno v. Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 1090, 117 So.2d
817, 820 (1960).
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sion of Article 552 of the Civil Code.1 46 It may be expected that
in the case of a conventional or a testamentary usufruct, the
owner will ordinarily take care to define the rights of the usu-
fructuary in the instrument creating the usufruct. In the ab-
sence of specific provision, the matter could be dealt with a
problem of interpretation which could be solved by reference to
the intention of the parties.14  But in the more frequent case
of legal usufruct, Louisiana courts will have to determine when
a mine or quarry is "actually worked," since valuable mineral
rights could be apportioned between the naked owner and the
usufructuary only on the basis of this determination.
With regard to the rights of a possessor in good faith, Lou-
isiana courts have held that the word "products" in Article 502
of the Civil Code 148 has the same meaning as fruits. In turn,
the word "fruits" has been declared to mean things produced
without depletion of the substance of the principal thing.14 9
These things are earned by a possessor in good faith and no
146. See King v. Buffington, 240 La. 955, 126 So.2d 326 (1961). See also
Gueno v. Medlenka, 238 La. 1081, 1091, 117 So.2d 817, 820 (1960): "[A]
usufructuary has a right to the proceeds of an oil well on the land subject to
the usufruct, if the well was already drilled and producing oil at the time when
the usufruct was created." Presumably, in such a case, mineral substances ei-
tracted from the ground, and the proceeds therefrom, will be regarded as natural
and civil fruits respectively. The court was quoting from Gulf Refining Co. v.
Garrett, 209 La. 674, 686, 25 So.2d 329, 332 (1945), which, on rehearing, was
set aside and remanded. 209 La. 674, 25 So.2d 329 (1946). The Garrett case
has been revived, however, only "as far as may be pertinent to the case at hand,"
namely with regard to the applicability of Article 552 of the Civil Code to mineral
operations. The common law rule is that if a mine is already opened, the life
tenant is entitled to the royalty and if not opened all that he is allowed is the
interest therefrom. See 18 A.L.R. 2d 106, 115 (1951).
147. Perhaps the proper solution should be to restrict application of Article
552 to cases in which the mineral lease itself (or the production of minerals) is
the subject matter of the usufruct. Further, the interpretation could be adopted
that Article 552 involves an "imperfect" usufruct, in which case the usufructuary
would have only the interest on the proceeds subject to reimbursement of the naked
owner at the termination of the usufruct.
148. See LA. CIVIL COnE art. 502 (1870) : "The products of the thing do not
belong to the simple possessor, and must be returned with the thing to the owner
who claims the same, unless the possessor held it bona fide." Cf. note 138 supra;
Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96, 114, 81 So. 769, 775 (1919) : "Between
the alternatives, therefore, of having to give the word 'fruits' the broad and com-
prehensive meaning of all kinds of products of land, or give the work 'products'
the restricted meaning of fruits, properly so called, we adopt the latter."
149. See Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96, 81 So. 769 (1919) ; Elder
v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 995, 996, 66 So. 337, 339 (1914) ("The right of a pos-
sessor in good faith to gather for his benefit the fruits of the property of another,
cannot be greater than the right of a usufructuary. 'He has no right to mines
and quarries not opened.' R.C.C. 552"). Trapping royalties are fruits. See
Rosenthal-Brown Fur Co. v. Jones-Frere Fur Co., 162 La. 403, 110 So. 630
(1926) ; Curran v. Jones, 163 La. 579, 112 So. 492 (1927).
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accounting is due to the true owner. 15 Timber' 5 ' and minerals 152
(as well as bonuses, delay rentals, and royalties deriving from
mineral rights) are not fruits. A possessor in good faith, there-
fore, must account to the owner for all values received from tim-
ber or mineral operations but is entitled to reimbursement of
all production costs.'5 According to Article 501 of the Civil
Code,' M a possessor in bad faith must return to the owner all
150. A possessor in good faith is accountable for the fruits of the thing pos-
sessed from the time the true owner makes demand for restitution. Woodcock v.
Baldwin, 110 La. 270, 34 So. 440 (1902). The possessor is liable for such fruits
as he might have obtained with ordinary good management. Actual production
may not be the measure of damages in all cases. See Winter v. Zacharie, 6 Rob.
466 (La. 1844). A possessor in good faith is one "who possesses under a title
translative of property and not defective on its face." See Vance v. Sentell, 178
La. 749, 758, 152 So. 513, 516 (1934) ; New Orleans v. Gaines, 82 U.S. 624
(1872). Cf. Derouen v. LeBleu, 18 So.2d 207 (La. App. 1944). In this case the
lower court had ordered defendant, a possessor in good faith, to return to the
owner of a cow a calf born during defendant's possession of the cow; the court
of appeal questioned the correctness of the lower court's judgment but did not
pass on it as defendant failed to appeal that issue.
151. Harang v. Bowie Lumber Co., 145 La. 96, 81 So. 769 (1919) (the court
discussed French doctrine extensively and overruled a number of cases holding that
a possessor in good faith was under no obligation to account to the owner for
the value of the timber cut).
152. See Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 66 So. 337 (1914), followed in Jackson
v. Shaw, 151 La. 795, 799, 92 So. 339 (1922). Cf. cases cited note 142 supra.
See also Logan v. State Gravel Co., 158 La. 105, 103 So. 526 (1925). But of.
Board of Commissioners of Caddo Levee District v. Pure Oil Co., 167 La. 801,
120 So. 373 (1928) (mineral royalties are civil fruits for purposes of prescrip-
tion) ; Gulf Refining Co. of Louisiana v. Hayne, 148 La. 340, 86 So. 891 (1921)(profits of mineral operations are civil fruits for purpose of indemnification of
mineral lessee by owner producing oil in breach of lease) ; cases cited note 157
infra.
153. McGee v. Louisiana Lumber Co., 123 La. 696, 49 So. 475 (1909) ; Ball
Lumber Co. v. Simms Lumber Co., 121 La. 627, 46 So. 674 (1908) ; Gardere v.
Blanton, 35 La. Ann. 811 (1883), cited in Elder v. Ellerbe, 135 La. 990, 995, 66
So. 337, 338 (1914) (timber) ; Mantel v. Hunt, 197 So. 402 (La. App. 1940)(minerals). Comment, Measure of Damages for Unauthorized Production of Oil
and Gas; the Role of Good and Bad Faith, 15 TuL. L. REV. 291 (1941). Thus, in
effect, a possessor in good faith deriving profits from mineral operations is ac-
corded the same protection as a possessor in bad faith deriving "fruits." Cf. infra
note 154.
154. "The fruits produced by the thing belong to its owner, although they may
have been produced by the work and labor of a third person, or from seeds sown
by him, on the owner's reimbursing such person his expenses." See Lawrence v.
Young, 144 La. 1, 80 So. 18 (1918) ; Laride v. Perkins, 10 Orl. App. 19 (La.
App. 1912). Although this article speaks of "a third person," courts, ordinarily,
restrict its application to the case of a possessor in bad faith. Cf. Moore v. Pitre,
149 La. 910, 921, 90 So. 252, 256 (1921) ; Harang v. Gheens Realty Co., 155 La.
68, 95, 98 So. 760, 769 (1924). Thus, technically, a lessee in bad faith cannot
qualify as a possessor and is not entitled to his production costs. Of. Hammonds
v. Buzbee, 170 La. 573, 128 So. 520 (1930) ; Elrod v. Hart, 146 So. 797 (La.
App. 1933). But apparently a lessee exploiting timber or minerals in good faith
qualifies as an ordinary possessor in bad faith and is entitled to compensation for
production costs under Article 501. See Cooke v. Gulf Refining Co., 135 La. 609,
613, 65 So. 758, 759 (1914) (minerals) ; Ball and Bro. Lumber Co. v. Simms
Lumber Co., 121 La. 627, 46 So. 674 (1908) (timber). Trapping royalties are(natural or civil) fruits. Thus, a possessor in bad faith is still entitled to com-
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"fruits" and in turn, the owner must reimburse him for all his
costs. In connection with timber and minerals, the rule is that
since these things are not fruits, the possessor in bad faith must
return them to the owner without being entitled to deduction
of production costs.155
In the field of community property, it is well settled in Lou-
isiana that "the fruits, both civil and natural, of the husband's
separate property fall into the community during its exist-
ence."1 56 In this context and also for state income tax purposes,
Louisiana courts have extended the notion of fruits to include
economic advantages derived from a thing as a result of deplet-
ing its substance. Thus, mineral royalties have been declared to
be civil fruits which fall into the community. 15 7 Presumably,
the same rule would apply to royalties derived from exploitation
of timber. For purposes of federal income tax, however, federal
courts have refused to treat mineral royalties from separate
property as fruits falling into the community; consequently,
pensation for costs. See Rosenthal-Brown Fur Co. v. Jones-Frere Fur Co., 162
La. 403, 110 So. 630 (1926) ; Curran v. Jones, 163 La. 579, 112 So. 492 (1927).
Article 501 of the Civil Code applies also to the administrator of an estate. See
Succession of Hawthorne, 158 La. 637, 104 So. 481 (1925) (administrator liable
for fruits to be received by exercise of prudent management; he can deduct ex-
penses).
155. Like any possessor deriving from a thing economic advantages which
cannot classify as "fruits," a mineral lessee in bad faith is not entitled to com-
pensation for production costs. See Nabors Oil and Gas Co. v. Louisiana Oil
Refining Co., 151 La. 361, 91 So. 765 (1922) (reversed on other grounds).
Similar results have been reached in timber cases. A possessor (or lessee) in bad
faith is liable for the value of timber in manufactured state, without deduction
of expenses. State v. Williams Cypress Co., 131 La. 62, 70, 58 So. 1033, 1036
(1912).
156. Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 781, 57 So.2d 679, 682
(1952) citing Succession of Goll, 156 La. 910, 101 So. 263 (1924) ; Peters v.
Klein, 161 La. 664, 109 So. 349 (1926) ; Succession of Ratcliff, 212 La. 563, 33
So.2d 114 (1947). Article 2402 of the Louisiana Civil Code provides that "the
profits of all the effects of which the husband has the administration and enjoy-
ment" form part of the community property. The word "profits" has been held
to be an incorrect translation from the French and should read "fruits."
157. See Milling v. Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 780, 57 So. 679, 682
(1952): "Although the products of mines and quarries, once taken, would not
be reproduced, nevertheless, they 'are products of the land, and products may be
assimilated to fruits, within the meaning of R.C.C. art. 2671'." Of. King v.
Buffington, 240 La. 955, 963, 126 So.2d 326, 329 (1961) : "The case of Milling v.
Collector of Revenue, 220 La. 773, 57 So.2d 679, relied on by the defendant, was
concerned with the declarations of Article 2402 of the Louisiana Civil Code con-
cerning property which forms the community; what was said there can have no
bearing on the question presented in the instant case." See also Daigre v. Daigre,
228 La. 682, 83 So.2d 900 (1955) (retirement pension and stock dividend deriving
from the separate property of the husband are not fruits and do not fall in the
community) ; Daggett, Mineral Rights as They Affect the Community Property
System with Particular Reference to their Effect on Usufructuary and Naked
Owner, I LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 17 (1938).
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these royalties are taxed as separate property. 5 8 Similarly, for
purposes of state severance tax, mineral royalties are not re-
garded as civil fruits in Louisiana.159
Louisiana courts, charged with the duty to interpret and
apply the Civil Code to concrete issues, have managed to reach
commendable solutions and to do justice on the merits-though
not infrequently at the expense of deviation from a consistent
conceptual pattern. Indeed, they have apparently adopted dif-
ferent notions of fruits for different purposes. In connection
with the rights of a usufructuary and a possessor in good or
bad faith, and for state severance tax purposes, Louisiana courts
have confined the notion of fruits to economic advantages which
are produced periodically without diminution of the substance
of the principal thing. 160 As to community property and state
income taxation, however, the courts have adopted a much broad-
er notion of fruits which includes economic advantages resulting
from a depletion of the principal thing. These apparently incon-
sistent decisions could be reconciled by a conceptual analysis
classifying timber and minerals as civil fruits which belong to
the owner in all cases. 6 ' Thus, neither a possessor in good faith
nor a usufructuary would be entitled to these civil fruits. A more
desirable ground of reconciliation would be to distinguish be-
tween "fruits" and "products." A possessor in good faith should
be entitled to keep the fruits but not the products of a thing.162
Similarly, a usufructuary should be entitled to the fruits of a
thing and to products only within the limits of Articles 551 and
552 of the Civil Code. For purposes of community property and
state income taxation, products other than fruits (e.g., mineral
royalties, delay rentals, and bonuses) could form part of the
158. See Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Gray, 159 F.2d 834 (5th Cir.
1947) (the court conceding the proposition that mineral royalties may be regarded
as fruits for other purposes). See also United States v. Harang, 165 F.2d 106
(5th Cir. 1947) (the court indicating that local law, and classifications based
thereon, may not be controlling for income tax purposes).
159. Wright v. Imperial Oil and Gas Products Co., 177 La. 482, 148 So. 685
(1933).
160. Federal courts have reached the same conclusion for purposes of federal
income taxation, seemingly on the basis of Louisiana law. See Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Gray, 159 F.2d 834 (5th Cir. 1947).
161. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1960-1961 Term -
Mineral Rights, 22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 329 (1962).
162. This suggestion has nothing to do with the interpretation placed by the
courts on Article 502 of the Civil Code. Indeed, in that article the word "prod-
ucts" has the same meaning as the word "fruits" in the preceding Article 501.
Clarification may be necessary only in connection with the interpretation of Article
2402 of the Civil Code: "profits" in that article may mean both "fruits" and
"products."
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community as "profits" within the literal meaning of Article
2402 of the Civil Code.
Comparative law. In classical Roman law, fruits (fructus)
were, generally, the products derived from a thing whether re-
sulting in diminution of its economic value or not. 163 Distinction
was made between natural fruits (fructus naturales) which
were the product of natural forces or industry and civil fruits
(fructus civiles) which were the product of legal transactions.
Ordinarily, natural fruits were corporeal objects while civil
fruits were values resulting from the ownership of a thing or
from the conduct of business. These values could be converted
into corporeal objects, particularly money.
Natural fruits were divided into several categories. Hanging
fruits acquired individuality and became things upon actual sep-
aration from the principal thing. Separated fruits (fructus
separati) were fruits detached from the principal things wheth-
er as a result of natural forces or of human action. Collected
fruits (fructus percepti) were fruits gathered by human action,
consisting in acquisition of possession. Finally, fruits which
ought to have been collected (fructus percipiendi) were fruits
for which a possessor in bad faith should account to the true
owner.
Fruits followed the juridical situation of the principal thing
in all cases. Since stolen things could not be acquired by acqui-
sitive prescription, the same applied to the fruits of stolen
things. The owner of a thing ordinarily acquired its fruits. It
was only in exceptional cases that other persons - a lessee, a
usufructuary, and a bona fide possessor - acquired them. The
owner of the principal thing and a possessor in good faith ac-
quired fruits by separation; a usufructuary and a lessee by col-
lection. The possessor in good faith was entitled to keep the
fruits he collected and consumed up to the time of the initiation
of an action. He was liable to return all fruits collected during
the pendency of the action and to pay damages for the fruits
that he should have collected by exercising due care.
In Germany, prior to the enactment of the Civil Code, fruits
were conceived of as periodically recurring economic advantages
163. See WEiss, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN PRIVATRECWTS 135 (1949).
BUt of. SOHM-MITTEIS-WENGER, INSTITUTIONEN DES R6MISCHEN RECHTS 262
(1923). The children of a female slave, however, were not fruits. Cf. LA. CIVIL
CODE arts. 492, 539 (1825).
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obtained from a thing according to its destination and without
diminution of its substance. 1 4 The German Civil Code enlarged
the notion of fruits by abandoning the requirement of preserva-
tion of substance in all cases and in the case of organic products,
the requirement of production according to destination.' This
broad notion of fruits in the German Civil Code made necessary
the enactment of specific provisions limiting the right of certain
persons to the acquisition of fruits produced according to the
destination of the thing and not resulting in diminution of its
substance.166
In the complex scheme of the German Civil Code, fruits are
treated as a species of the generic concept "profits." Profits are
defined as "the fruits of a thing or of a right, as well as the ad-
vantages which the use of the thing or of the right confers.' 67
The habitation of a house by the owner, the enjoyment of one's
own automobile, and the trophy which a race horse wins are
given as examples of "advantages," as distinguished from
"fruits." Fruits are subdivided into fruits of things and fruits
of rights, direct or indirect. Direct fruits of a thing are its
organic products and everything (other than advantages of use)
derived from it according to its destination. 8 Organic products
(e.g., the young of animals, crops, and trees) are fruits whether
produced according to the destination of the principal thing or
not, and whether or not there is a resulting diminution of its
value. A fruit-bearing tree is not destined to be cut down and
burned as wood, yet it is a fruit of the ground. Similarly, though
a piece of land stripped of its timber suffers diminution of value,
the timber is regarded as its fruit. However, the right of certain
persons to obtain fruits is limited to that portion of the fruits
164. See 1 ENNECCERUS-NIPPERDEY, 1 ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BURGERLICIIEN
RECETS 537 (1952) LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BaRGERLICHEN GESETZ-
RUCHES 364 (1957) SOERGEL-SIEBERT, BtRGERLICHIES GESETZBUCH 350 (1959) ;
STAUDINGER, KOMMENTAR ZUM B.G.B. 479 (1957). Kruchen, Frucht und Frucht-
erwerbsrecht, in 3 REOHTSVERGLEICHENDES HANDWORTERBUCH 540 (1931) ;
Schnoor von Garolsfeld, Soziale Ausgestaltung des Erwerbs von Erzeugnissen, 145
ARcHiv FOR DIE CIVILISPICHE PRAXIS 27 (1939) ; Wieacker, Sachbegriff, Sachein-
heit und Sachzuordnung, 148 ARcnIV FtR DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 57, 98
(1943).
165. GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 99: "Fruits of a thing are the products of the
thing and such other profits as are obtained from the thing according to its desti-
nation. Fruits of a right are the revenues which the right yields according to its
destination, particularly where one has a right to obtain parts of the ground the
parts so obtained. Fruits are also the revenues which a thing or a right yields by
reason of a legal relation."
166. Id. arts. 581, 993, 1039, 2133.
167. Id. art. 100.
168. See id. art. 99(1).
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which may be regarded as a product of the thing according to
rules of orderly management. 169 Products resulting from the
destruction of a thing (e.g., the meat and bones of an animal)
are not fruits. In the last analysis, characterization of products
as fruits may depend upon prevailing conceptions in society.
17°
Products (other than organic ones) derived from a thing are
regarded as its direct fruits only if produced according to the
destination of the principal thing. It is not necessary that these
products be periodically recurring or that the substance of the
thing be preserved. Here belong the products and output of
mines and quarries. The component parts of a completely de-
stroyed thing (e.g., the products of the demolition of a house)
are not fruits.
Direct fruits of rights are the revenues which rights produce
according to their destination.' 7' Direct fruits of the right of
usufruct are the revenues obtained by the usufructuary; direct
fruits of mineral rights are royalties due to one entitled thereto;
direct fruit of the right to claim a capital sum is the interest due
to the claimant. The notion of "direct fruits of rights" has been
criticized as too shallow. 172 In reality, most of these revenues are
fruits of things rather than rights obtained by virtue of a right
other than ownership. The same revenue can thus be a fruit of
a thing (namely, fruit of the right of ownership) and fruit of a
right (other than ownership). In any case, as direct fruits of
rights are regarded not only revenues obtained but also claims
for accrued revenues.
Indirect fruits of things or rights are revenues which a thing
or a right produces by operation of law or by virtue of a legal
relation directed to the acquisition of these revenues (civil
fruits).13 Such are mostly sums due for permission to use a
thing or to exercise a right (e.g., rents, interest on a loan).
In the framework of the German Civil Code, the notion of
fruits is important in connection with several legal relations and
169. Of. id. arts. 581 (lessee); art. 993 (possessor). See also id. art. 1039
(usufructuary under obligation to account to the naked owner for the value of all
products obtained in excess of the rules of an orderly management of the thing
subject to the usufruct).
170. Of. R.G. Oct. 16, 1912, 80 R.G.Z. 229, 232 (1912).
171. See GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 99(2).
172. See LEHMANN, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BT:IRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES 365
(1957).
173. See GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 99(3).
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institutions. In the first place, fruits are important with regard
to acquisition of rights. One's right to obtain fruits is deter-
mined by rules of property as to natural fruits and by rules of
the law of obligations as to civil fruits. Secondly, the notion of
fruits is important for the determination of the rights and duties
of a usufructuary or a possessor in good faith vis-a-vis the owner
of a thing. These persons are entitled to obtain "fruits" as dis-
tinguished from detached component parts of a thing.174 Thirdly,
the notion of fruits is important in connection with obligations
of certain persons to return, or to account for, fruits obtained.1 75
Finally, the notion is important in cases involving partition
among successive beneficiaries of fruits obtained within a cer-
tain period. The moment of separation is determinative as to
natural fruits and the moment of acquisition for civil fruits
which do not recur periodically. For periodically recurring civil
fruits the duration of one's right is determinative. 176 Analogous
provisions govern the apportionment of expenses and charges.177
The Greek Civil Code, following the pattern of Roman-Byzan-
tine law, distinguishes fruits into those natural and civil. 178 In
addition, following the German Civil Code, the Greek Civil Code
establishes the categories of "fruits of things" and "fruits of
rights," and introduces the notion of "profits.' 1 79 According to
the Greek code, fruits of things are organic products, advantages
obtained according to the destination of a thing, and any revenue
the thing may produce by operation of law or by reason of a
legal relation. According to the prevailing view, organic prod-
174. Of. id. arts. 954 et seq., 1030, 1039, 1089, 1213, 1383.
175. See id. art. 102: "He who is legally bound to return the fruits is entitled
to reimbursement of costs incurred for the production of such fruits, in so far as
they accord with a prudent management and do not exceed the value of the fruits."
176. See id. art. 101: "If one is entitled to receive the fruits of a thing, or of
a right, up to a certain time or from a certain time, he has the following rights,
insofar as is not otherwise provided: (1) he is entitled to the products and parts
of the ground designated in Article 99 (1), even when he is to receive them as
fruits of a right, insofar as they are separated from the thing during the existence
of his rights; (2) he is entitled to other fruits, insofar as they become due during
the continuance of his right; if, however, the fruits consist of the compensation
for the use or the usufruct, in interest, a share of the profits or other proceeds
derived at regularly recurring intervals, the holder of such rights is entitled to a
part (of said profits or proceeds) proportionate to the duration of his rights."
177. See id. art. 102.
178. GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 961: "Fruits of a thing are its products as well
as everything which one derives from a thing according to its destination. Fruits
of a right are the revenues which the right yields according to its destination.
Fruits are likewise the revenues which the thing or the right yields by virtue of
some legal relation (civil fruits)."
179. Id. art. 962: "Profits are not only the fruits of a thing or a right, but
also every advantage which the use of the thing or of the right confers."
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ucts are regarded as fruits only if the substance of the principal
thing is preserved.18 0 The destination of a thing as fruit-produc-
ing is determined by reference to its nature, prevailing concep-
tions in society, and the intention of the parties to a transaction.
Fruits of rights are royalties and interests deriving from rights
other than ownership.. For the rest, the Greek Civil Code and
doctrine follow closely the German prototypes. 181
180. See BALIS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL LAW 518 (1955) (in Greek).
181. See GREEK CIVIL CODE art. 963: "He who has the right to collect the
natural fruits of a thing or right up to a certain time or from a certain time, is
entitled, in the absence of other agreement, only to fruits separated [from the
principal thing] during the existence of his right. With regard to civil fruits,
especially rents, interests, dividends or other revenues which are produced regu-
larly, the one entitled thereto receives in the absence of different agreement, a por-
tion proportionate to the duration of his right"; id. art. 964: "He who is obliged
by law to return fruits is entitled to compensation for expenses incurred for their
production, provided that expenses do not exceed the value of the fruits."
